A Secure Computing Platform for Building Automation Using Microkernel-based Operating Systems by Wang, Xiaolong
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
November 2018
A Secure Computing Platform for Building
Automation Using Microkernel-based Operating
Systems
Xiaolong Wang
University of South Florida, xiaolongw@mail.usf.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Wang, Xiaolong, "A Secure Computing Platform for Building Automation Using Microkernel-based Operating Systems" (2018).
Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7589
A Secure Computing Platform for Building Automation Using
Microkernel-based Operating Systems
by
Xiaolong Wang
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science and Engineering
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
College of Engineering
University of South Florida
Major Professor: Xinming Ou, Ph.D.
Jarred Ligatti, Ph.D.
Srinivas Katkoori, Ph.D.
Nasir Ghani, Ph.D.
Siva Raj Rajagopalan, Ph.D.
Date of Approval:
October 26, 2018
Keywords: System Security, Embedded System, Internet of Things, Cyber-Physical Systems
Copyright © 2018, Xiaolong Wang
DEDICATION
In loving memory of my father,
to my beloved, Blanka, and my family.
Thank you for your love and support.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Xinming Ou for his guidance,
encouragement, and unreserved support throughout my PhD journey. Dr. Xinming Ou introduced
me to the field of security, and helped me identify important security problem in the domains of
Cyber-Physical Systems and the Internet of things. His thorough scientific approach and research
philosophy – “start from real problems, create solutions that last" - have been inspirational in the
years of my research. He has set an example of excellence as a researcher, mentor, and role model.
I would like to thank Dr. Raj Rajagopalan for his insightful ideas, feedback, and inspiring
discussions that helped me shape this research; Dr. Masaaki Mizuno, Dr. Mitchell Neilsen for their
guidance and support with their tremendous knowledge in microkernel and embedded systems; and
Dr. John Hatcliff for his advice and vision in the design of high assurance systems. Without them
I would not have been able to carrying out this work.
I’m deeply indebted to Dr. Jarred Ligatti, Dr. Srinivas Katkoori and Dr. Nasir Ghani
for serving on my dissertation committee. This dissertation would not be possible without their
numerous constructive feedback and invaluable inputs and suggestions.
Finally I would like to express my gratitude to my fellow Argus Cyber Security Lab colleagues
for the many memorable times, and fruitful discussions. I’m grateful to Richard Habeeb, who has
closely worked with me in the past 3 years, and responsible for implementing and testing the seL4
version. With his help I could not possibly be finished with my thesis by now. I would also like to
thank my wife, Blanka, for proofreading drafts of this thesis.
This research was supported the Department of Homeland (DHS) Security under contract
number D15PC00303, and National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1136040.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES iii
LIST OF FIGURES iv
ABSTRACT v
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Building Automation Systems 1
1.2 Safety and Security Challenges for BAS 2
1.3 Existing BAS Security Solutions 4
CHAPTER 2: VISION 7
CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY 9
3.1 BRI Scenario 9
3.1.1 Biocontainment Facility 9
3.1.2 BRI Policies 10
3.1.3 Airflow and Air Pressure Control 13
3.1.4 Other Control Tasks 15
3.2 Smoke Evacuation Scenario 16
3.2.1 Smoke Evacuation Policies 16
3.2.2 Daily Operation 17
3.2.3 Smoke Evacuation 19
CHAPTER 4: BUILDING AUTOMATION SECURITY ISSUES 21
4.1 Building Automation Network 21
4.1.1 Building Automation Network Protocols 22
4.1.2 Field Sensors and Actuators in BAS 23
4.1.3 Automation Controllers in BAS 24
4.1.4 Management in BAS 25
4.2 Security of Building Automation Network 26
4.3 Security of BAS Controllers 27
4.4 Security of BAS Management 29
4.5 BAS Threat Summary 30
CHAPTER 5: DESIGN OVERVIEW 32
5.1 Microkernel Architecture 32
5.1.1 Microkernel History 33
5.1.2 Microkernel Design 34
i
5.1.3 Microkernel Security Benefits 35
5.2 Mandatory Access Control 36
5.3 Proxy-based Network Communication 37
CHAPTER 6: IMPLEMENTATION 41
6.1 MINIX 3 Microkernel 41
6.2 The seL4 Microkernel 42
6.3 Implementation of Access Control Matrix 42
6.4 Implementation of Proxy Framework and Security Tunneling 45
6.5 An Illustrative Example 47
CHAPTER 7: EVALUATION 49
7.1 Temperature Control Scenario 49
7.1.1 Single-device Temperature Control Scenario 49
7.1.2 Network-based Temperature Control Scenario 51
7.1.3 Implementation using Linux 53
7.2 Security Evaluation 53
7.2.1 Threat Model and Security Analysis 53
7.2.1.1 Attacks from Network 54
7.2.1.2 Compromised Interface Process 55
7.2.1.3 Compromised Field Level Control Process 56
7.3 Performance Evaluation 57
CHAPTER 8: BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY AND VIRTUALIZATION 60
8.1 Virtualization 61
8.2 Architecture 64
8.2.1 seL4 as Microvisor 64
8.2.2 Policy-enforced Mandatory Access Control 65
8.2.3 Secure Execution Environment 66
8.3 Experiment Implementation 67
8.3.1 Prototype 67
8.3.2 Secure Boot 70
8.4 Evaluation 72
8.4.1 IoT Gateway 72
8.4.2 Security Evaluation 73
8.4.3 Performance 75
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 77
REFERENCES 79
APPENDIX A: COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS 88
ii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1 Known potential threats 31
Table 7.1 IPC RTT for Linux and MINIX 3 on a BeagleBone Black Board 58
Table 7.2 Network RTT for Linux and MINIX 3 on a BeagleBone Black Board 59
Table 8.1 Lmbench results for seL4 microvisor on TK1 clocked at 696 MHz 76
iii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 Envisioned building security/safety control framework 8
Figure 3.1 Biocontainment laboratory scenario layout 12
Figure 3.2 Biocontainment laboratory scenario structure 12
Figure 3.3 Airflow and air pressure control 14
Figure 3.4 HVAC control system 18
Figure 5.1 Microekernel vs. monolithic kernel 35
Figure 5.2 Each controller enforces global policy locally, allowing process A to communi-
cate with process B over remote proxies 38
Figure 6.1 Fine-grained IPC using access control matrix 44
Figure 6.2 Three devices, four process scenario demonstrating the usage of cryptographic
tunneling between the proxies 48
Figure 7.1 Single device temperature control scenario logic structure 50
Figure 7.2 Temperature control testbed 51
Figure 7.3 Single device temperature control scenario process communication 52
Figure 7.4 Multiple device temperature control scenario logic structure 52
Figure 7.5 Single device temperature control scenario process communication 53
Figure 8.1 Secure execution environment using seL4 microvisor 68
Figure 8.2 Cloud connector in conventional systems 73
Figure 8.3 Cloud connector in secure execution environment 74
iv
ABSTRACT
Building Automation System (BAS) is a complex distributed control system that is widely
deployed in commercial, residential, industrial buildings for monitoring and controlling mechan-
ical/electrical equipment. Through increasing industrial and technological advances, the control
components of BAS are becoming increasingly interconnected. Along with potential benefits, in-
tegration also introduces new attack vectors, which tremendous increases safety and security risks
in the control system. Historically, BAS lacks security design and relies on physical isolation and
“security through obscurity”. These methods are unacceptable with the “smart building” technolo-
gies. The industry needs to reevaluate the safety and security of the current building automation
system, and design a comprehensive solution to provide integrity, reliability, and confidentiality on
both system and network levels.
This dissertation focuses on the system level in the effort to provide a reliable computing
foundation for the devices and controllers. Leveraged on the preferred security features such as,
robust modular design, small privilege code, and formal verifiability of microkernel architecture,
this work describes a security enhanced operating system with built-in mandatory access control
and a proxy-based communication framework for building automation controllers. This solution
ensures policy-enforced communication and isolation between critical applications and non-critical
applications in a potentially hostile cyber environment.
v
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Building Automation Systems
Building Automation Systems (BASs) are large-scale distributed control systems that aim
to improve autonomous control and the customized management of building environments. A
typical BAS controls every aspect of a building’s operation from lighting, heating, ventilation and
air conditioning (HVAC), to fire safety, access control, video, and more. BAS operations directly
impact the energy consumption of building facilities. According to the Department of Energy,
buildings account for about 40% of total energy consumption and 75% of electricity consumption
in the U.S., and those numbers are increasing each year [1]. Naturally, there is growing motivation
to develop new technologies for BASs to improve occupant comfort and at the same time reduce
energy consumption and operating costs.
Traditionally, BASs consist of multiple standalone application-specific subsystems. Each sub-
system only provides a single service, such as temperature control, ventilation, etc. Devices in each
subsystem are connected through building automation networks (BANs), which used to be separated
from the IT systems in the environment. The control logic is managed through central management
servers that are called Building Management Systems (BMSs) that connects with Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs) in a master-slave pattern. Different subsystems are coupled into different
control domains (e.g., safety domain, security domain), and are managed separately.
With the rapid commercial expansion of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) or popularly known
as the Internet of Things (IoT) in industry, developers and researchers have sought to embrace the
concept of “smart buildings”, which leverages various sensors to better understand living context,
provides IP-enabled actuators to control the environment, and interconnects existing control sys-
tems to be more responsive to customized needs. Buildings are undergoing a transformation to
better serve customers and occupants through advanced automation and networking. This, in turn,
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requires integrating increasingly sophisticated computing and networking capabilities within BASs;
the robustness and stability of which is crucial to support occupants’ daily routine and ensure both
security and safety for normal operations as well as during emergencies. These advances have made
life easier for occupants and helped developers find new ways to, e.g., reduce energy consumption.
In order to achieve the goal of energy conservation, a tight integration among sensors, controls,
and intelligence is indispensable. Today, a state-of-the-art BAS integrates multiple subsystems at
the device level. This integration not only means interconnecting these existing systems but also
means the enabling of remote control and data acquisition. Because of these changes, cloud-based
machine learning solutions and Internet-accessible management systems are starting to become
common in BASs. Although, benefits, such as agile reaction and cascaded control are unarguable,
Like other domains that are embracing the CPS perspective (such as smart grid, distributed robotics,
autonomous vehicles and avionics systems), the development of BAS as a system of systems is now
facing multiple obstacles to progress, particularly the nexus of safety-security and the reliability
challenges associated with the threat of cyber attacks.
1.2 Safety and Security Challenges for BAS
The integration between the control network and IT network dramatically increases the attack
surface of BAS, offering adversaries more opportunities to attack than ever before. Cyber attacks
not only increase the energy consumption by tampering with carefully laid plans, but also can alter
the functionalities of control components, thereby impacting the overall safety of the buildings.
The lack of appropriate interoperability and secure architecture standards leaves potential control
hazards and threats in play, especially for safety critical facilities.
BASs are already connected to the Internet. As shown by Billy Rios at Black Hat USA 2014 [2],
there are 21,000 Tridium Niagara Systems (one of the most popular platforms for building control)
connected to the Internet. It has been identified in over 50,000 buildings which are exposed to the
Internet either intentionally or due to misconfiguration and can be publicly searched using tools such
as Shodan [2, 3]. Besides, BAS widely uses outdated low-level protocols, such as BACnet, KNX,
Modbus, which send data in plaintext and lack proper authentication mechanisms. As previous
works [4,5] show, attackers can easily sniff control packets, modify Programmable Logic Controller
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(PLC) arbitrarily, and use carefully crafted low-level data gathered through PLCs to inject high-
level control software. Moreover, many commercial off-the-shelf BAS, like MetaSys and Niagara are
based on outdated Windows operating systems. The discovery of the first cyber-weapon, Stuxnet [6],
suggests that specifically crafted malware can be easily launched against control networks such as
BAS to sabotage high security-concerned institutions.
Recent high-profile attacks have demonstrated the possible threats and potential impacts
of cyber attacks in building environments. For example, in 2013 researchers infiltrated Google’s
Australia office through their building automation network [7]. Mirsky et al. have created a proof-
of-concept malware, HVACKer, that demonstrated how attackers can use HVAC systems to bridge
air-gapped networks with the outside world [8]. While the U.S. Department of Energy works to-
gether with alliances launching a new Net Zero Energy Installation (NZEI) initiative for achieving
self-sustaining buildings, building infrastructure is integrating with different internal and external
infrastructures [9]. Hacking into these systems have also been shown to be trivial. For example,
in winter 2016, a rookie hacker launched a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against an
HVAC system which resulted in the loss of heating for two buildings in Finland [10]. Such attacks
not only can help attackers gain control of BAS, but might also provide a stepping stone for further
infiltration of other critical infrastructures such as power, water, transportation, health service, etc.
The challenge of securing building automation has multiple dimensions. First, buildings are
heterogeneous. Buildings are designed for different purposes, and therefore have distinct require-
ments. For example, the automation system for a stadium might focus on how to manage lighting,
temperature, and increased ventilation to maintain low carbon dioxide concentration. On the other
hand, the main concern for a biocontainment facility or a chemical plant could be minimizing air
exchange between different areas to reduce the risk of cross-contamination. The design of the next
generation BAS has to consider the details of the varying use cases and understand the distinct
requirements therein.
Secondly, a BAS is hierarchical. Different sub-hierarchies have different views of the system.
Where and how each sub-hierarchy enforces the various policies has a significant impact on the
overall security, safety, and reliability of the building. It is vital to have a global view of the
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system from top to bottom with a proper abstraction. Formalizing the various security and safety
requirements and analyzing threats from a global view of the system, and designing policies and
appropriate security mechanisms to uphold them should be a key step in BAS design.
Last but not least, the interoperability of BAS is challenging. Not only are highly integrated
subsystems openly connected through networks but they are also interacting through the physical
features that they control (e.g., open doors change airflow patterns). When designing a BAS, it is
often impossible to completely isolate one control system from another.
Considering the tremendous upcoming changes in next-generation BAS, and the potential
risks it will cause, it is critical to rethink and reevaluate how the building automation systems are
designed and organized together. In order to provide the necessary safety/security guarantees in
the distributed environment, security cannot be an afterthought, but should be one of the critical
considerations of the entire design and implementation process. The security evaluation includes
not only mechanisms for secure network communication, authentication, but should also include
the embedded platforms, system architecture, operating systems etc. Furthermore, for practical
reasons, the legacy subsystems and standard industrial control protocols in existing BASs have to
be considered.
1.3 Existing BAS Security Solutions
The related work of this dissertation can be summarized in three categories: (1) the studies
of safety and security in building automation system; (2) secure operating systems for embedded
devices; (3) secure virtualization for embedded systems.
The security and safety issues of building automation systems is a broad research topic and
although still in its early stages, has attracted a lot of attention from academia. For example, the
Automation Systems group at the Vienna University of Technology (TU Wien) has been working
on security and safety related topics on home and building automation. W.Granzer et al.’s works
on BAS security issues provides good insight into the security challenges in BAS [11, 12, 13]. They
studied safety and security threats at each level of the system, and proposed a security extension
on the KNX/EIB protocol. Much of their work focuses on network protocol related security. In a
2009 paper, they discuss the use of cryptographic technology to secure building automation com-
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munication over IP networks [14]. This method is very similar to the network tunneling approach,
I proposed in this work. However, in this work the network tunneling approach is part of the
proxy-based network communication in an attempts to apply communication policies in existing
BAS.
Furthermore, S. Dünhaupt’s work on a study of vulnerabilities in industrial automation sys-
tems has systematically reviewed the known security attack vectors in automation systems in gen-
eral [15]. F. Praus et al. in 2016 provided an extensive survey of the security requirements for
distributed control applications in BAS [16]. This work discussed various security protection tech-
niques, such as static analysis, formal verification etc. and proposed a secure control application
architecture at a high level. This work shares a similar vision with those researchers. However,
this work views the safety and security issues from a system perspective, and focuses on securing
critical control applications, enforcing global policies, through trustworthy operating systems. To
my best knowledge, this work is the first attempt to design a secure computing foundation for the
next-generation BAS embedded devices.
Over the years many efforts have been carried out in the design of secure operating systems.
One of the most widely-adapted ones is Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [17]. It has been applied
in Android OS and lives in millions of commercial smart phones [18]. SELinux enforces mandatory
access control by monitoring and checking process operations against kernel-stored policy. SELinux
provides comprehensive process control and flexible authorization models. It leverages the Linux
Security Module (LSM) hooks to implement checks in the Linux kernel. However, SELinux resides
in the monolithic Linux kernel. The effectiveness of the reference monitor hinges on whether the
whole Linux kernel, including that all the device drivers are free of security bugs. The underlying
Linux OS adopts a monolithic kernel architecture. Moreover, due to the complexity of Linux,
the system requires complex protection states representation that involves extensive amounts of
explicitly defined type labels and policies to express all the necessary access relationships [19]. As
a result it is hard, if not impossible, to understand and reason about the correctness of a SELinux
policy. The proposed approach takes advantage of the microkernel architecture. The modular design
in microkernel architectures reduces the chance of kernel space vulnerability. Also, since the policy
5
only needs to concern the IPC primitive, the policies are much simpler and easier to reason about.
This better suits the embedded system domain. Additionally, there are many microkernel-based
OSs that have been proposed. Many of them belong to the L4 family, such as L4Ka::Pistachio [20],
OKL4, etc. but when it comes to availability and portability to ARM architecture, MINIX 3 and
seL4 show great advantages, hence this work choose those two. Recently R. Gu et al. proposed a
certified kernel, CertiKOS. Although in its early stage it shows another promising approach [21].
With advancement in hardware, there have been many proposals of microkernel-based hyper-
visor. Among those microvisor, the NOVA, L4Re, OKL4 stands out. The NOVA is based on a
third-generation microkernel with 9000 lines of code in kernel space [22]. The NOVA hypervisor
uses a similar capability-based security model and implements VMM in userspace. However, NOVA
applies instruction emulation approach for virtualization, which complicates the VMM design. Fur-
thermore, NOVA is currently only available for X86 architecture. L4Re is another microkernel-based
operating system framework that focuses on real-time schedulability [23]. Similar to seL4 microvisor,
L4Re provides isolated user-land domains. L4Re supports both para-virtualization and hardware
assisted virtualization with multiple platforms, including X86, ARM, and MIPS. Another one is the
OKL4 microvisor, which is is the predecessor of seL4. OKL4 supports para-virtualization and has
been optimized for high performance for commercial usage with mature VMM and mature driver
frameworks [24]. Each of these have their own benefits, however, when it comes to security none of
them can provide the same level of guarantee of functional correctness and isolation, as the seL4.
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CHAPTER 2: VISION
Buildings are containers of many different types of human activities supported by various
types of technologies. The type and utility of a building determine its unique security/safety needs.
The lack of appropriate interoperability and secure architecture standards leaves potential control
hazards and threats in play, especially for safety critical facilities. On the other hand, buildings
are heterogeneous. Different buildings are designed for various purposes, therefore, have distinct
requirements. For example, the automation system for a stadium might focus on how to manage
lighting, temperature, and increased ventilation to maintain low carbon dioxide concentration, while
the main concern for a biocontainment facility or a chemical plant could be minimizing air exchange
between different areas to reduce the risk of cross-contamination.
Instead of relying upon traditional security approaches such as perimeter control and contin-
uous monitoring and patching, we believe that embedded controllers need to adopt a radically new
architectural approach to safety and security, so that core primitives supporting those properties
can be built in as opposed to being bolted on later. Due to the innate dynamics of building environ-
ments, the controllers must be able to guarantee reliable safety behavior under hostile conditions,
even when part of it are untrusted or compromised. Figure 2.1 shows the envisioned solution frame-
work. The very important first step is to research the multitude of security/safety issues that may
arise and properly model them so each embedded controller in the environment has clearly defined
security/safety requirements it has to uphold. Based upon scenario analysis, we can construct mod-
els of the specific building automation system, and extract safety/security constraints that should
be enforced by different layers of a system running on those embedded controllers. Finally, build a
layered architecture for embedded platforms so that applications can use these properties to achieve
security and safety specifically for their contexts.
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Figure 2.1: Envisioned building security/safety control framework
Based on the above positions, we envision a microkernel-based OS forms the core of the
embedded controller platform, due to the advantages of microkernel mentioned in chapter 1. The
core, with underlying hardware support, provides the following functionalities: (1) Process isolation
(control logic integrity); (2) scheduling with real-time constraint (responsiveness and availability);
(3) Inter-process communication and synchronization (data flow integrity and authenticity); (4)
Network communication (secure communication, confidentiality).
8
CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY 1
In order to fully understand the nature of building automation, analyze safety/security risks,
and balance the trade-offs between usability and security, we conducted case studies on two realistic
scenarios equipped with state-of-the-art building automation systems. One is for the automation
control system of a biocontainment laboratory that is modeled according to the field study of
Biosecurity Research Institute (BRI) at Kansas State University. The other is for an HVAC smoke
evacuation control system based on a campus building at the University of South Florida. For
safety consideration, all examples discussed in this paper are assumptive. This section documents
the mock-up scenarios.
3.1 BRI Scenario
BRI is a unique biocontainment research and education facility recently built at Kansas State
University. It is designed to conduct research on highly infectious animal diseases, pathogens, and
pests that may cause serious or potentially lethal disease in humans through inhalation. As a CDC
approved BSL-3 (biosafety level 3), ABSL-3 (animal biosafety level 3), and BSL3-Ag (biosafety level
3 agriculture) facility, BRI follows strict federal regulations and has a set of rigorous requirements
for building management policies. The proper management of the facility must protect laboratory
workers, persons outside of the laboratory, and people and/or animals in the neighbor community
from infectious agents that could be accidentally released from the laboratory.
3.1.1 Biocontainment Facility
An important use case of BAS is one for controlling and monitoring a biocontainment facility.
Biocontainment facilities are designed to do research on infectious diseases, pathogens, quarantined
pests, invasive alien species and living organisms [26]. The nature of this kind of laboratory makes
1Part of this chapter is published in ACM CCS 2015 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy
(CPS-SPC2015) [25] paper. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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it highly hazardous. Since some samples might be contagious for human beings, once reaching
the public space it could cause tremendous danger that even jeopardize human lives. In this case,
protecting just the worker is oftentimes not enough. Systems must also be in place to protect the
environment and the facility from possible contamination. In the United States, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have specified different biosafety levels of biocontainment
precautions. They range from the lowest level 1 (BSL-1) to the highest at level 4 (BSL-4) for iso-
lating dangerous biological agents in an enclosed laboratory facility [27]. Biosafety levels increase
safety and security measures as the dangers associated with the agents’ increase. For example,
BSL-3 is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, or production facilities in which work
is done with indigenous or exotic agents. The agents may cause serious or potentially lethal disease
after inhalation. BSL-4 is specifically for fatal diseases such as the Marburg or Ebola viruses [27].
For guiding the design and maintenance of laboratories, the CDC and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture - Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS) have published Biosafety in MicroBiolog-
ical and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) and USDA-ARS Facilities Design Standards respectively.
They define various policies and standards for HVAC, air pressure, temperature, and the procedure
of handling special situations [27, 28]. Moreover, The National Institutes of Health (NIH) details
design requirements and guidance manuals for biomedical research facilities [29]. In all of them,
BAS is regarded as critical and responsible for enforcing biosafety level and personnel security.
3.1.2 BRI Policies
In BRI, one of the high-priority concerns is the control of airborne hazards and to avoid the
potential risk of cross-contamination. A BSL-3 facility generally consists of a separate building with
clearly demarcated and isolated zones within the building, each of which is equipped with indepen-
dent ventilation and waste management systems. The BAS must support multiple institutional
policies. According to the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) stan-
dards published by HHS and CDC, each zone must enforce access control to the laboratories. The
laboratories must ensure directional airflow, negative air pressure with respect to its surrounding
environment, and complete isolation between each other. Access to the laboratory is through two
doors for isolation from unrestricted traffic flow. The laboratory doors must be self-closing and
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locked by default. Proper evacuation control for incidents and emergency situations, such as fire
and flood, that may result in exposure to infectious materials must be considered.
For the sake of simplicity, in this scenario, we are only considering a suite with five rooms in a
biocontainment facility. A biocontainment facility is usually separated into different isolated zones.
Each zone is totally independent of the others and has its own ventilation system. In our scenario,
the suite is composed of an isolated zone. It contains four laboratories for conducting different
research and a chamber as a public area for researchers. As shown in Figure 3.1, rooms start from
No. 1 to No. 4 are biocontainment laboratories and room No. 5 is the public chamber. The logic
structure of the suite BAS is shown in Figure 3.2. The suite must comply with basic biocontainment
laboratory standards. In this case, the suite should only allow limited authorized researchers to have
access. Every authentication should be logged for audit purposes. Each laboratory within this suite
has to constantly maintain a negative differential air pressure relative to the chamber room in order
to avoid airborne hazards exposures. Meanwhile, different laboratories maintain independent air
pressure among each other and airborne hazards exposures are prevented through controlling doors
by using interlock system installed in the chamber. Each laboratory has to keep the temperature in a
certain range. When a laboratory is operational, the fume hood fan in the room has to start working
steadily. Furthermore, aside from normal operations, laboratories need to be decontaminated when
hazards have been detected as exposed. In order to handle this situation, laboratories usually have
two modes: normal mode and decontamination mode (DECON mode). For this purpose, each room
has a strobe that is used to indicate emergency situations including power failure, DECON mode,
door-open-too-long alarm, etc. When in DECON mode, laboratories would only allow researchers to
exit and reject any ordinary user’s entering requests except requests from users with administrator
privilege. No matter in what emergency situations, certain functionalities of a laboratory have to
work – for example, user authentication and the door access system, directional airflow control, fire
alarm, etc. Besides, in order to prevent cross-contamination, no two doors in an isolated zone should
be allowed to open at the same time. This is enforced by the magnetic door interlock subsystem,
except when the fire alarm is being triggered. When the fire is being detected, the fire control
subsystem will override the interlock subsystem and unlock all doors at the same time.
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Figure 3.1: Biocontainment laboratory scenario layout
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Figure 3.2: Biocontainment laboratory scenario structure
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3.1.3 Airflow and Air Pressure Control
According to the policies, the critical responsibility of the BRI BAS is to isolate every labora-
tory from the others through access and air pressure controls. To provide negative air pressure and
prevent unwanted air transfer, proper room pressurization is essential. The design of the overall
BRI building automation is largely directed by this goal. To comply with BMBL’s two-door policy,
each zone in BRI consists of a number of laboratories and an out-facing chamber. All doors in the
zone are self-closing and self-locking. To avoid cross-contamination, all doors are equipped with
magnetic interlocks that only allow one door to open at any time. To maintain relative negative air
pressure and directed airflow, all rooms in the zone use the Volumetric Airflow Tracking Control
strategy (also called offset control) [30]. Airflow tracking preserves the desired relative differential
pressure between rooms or spaces by measuring the supply airflow and the exhaust airflow through
a Variable Air Volume (VAV) ventilation system and monitoring the exhaust airflow of each fume
hood in the laboratory. The control must ensure that the total amount of air constantly exhausted
from the room exceeds the amount of air supplied to the room by an offset. This design creates a
vacuum effect and causes the air to flow into the room through leakage areas such as door gaps,
instead of the other way around.
The airflow tracking is simple to manage and reliable in a relatively static situation. However,
it does not guarantee that a specific relative differential pressure value will be reached and main-
tained. The offset value has to be measured and calculated ahead of time, based on the size of room
and leakage area, which is guided by the infiltration curve for pressure difference vs. flowchart, and
the related equations [31].
The challenge in maintaining relative differential pressure for laboratories in BRI is related
to the door. An open door will instantly increase the leakage area of the laboratory and therefore
equalize the air pressures. In practice, while the door is open, it is impossible to maintain an ap-
preciable differential pressure, even when the supply airflow is completely shut off. At the same
time, the VAV fume hoods that are equipped in the laboratory also complicate the differential pres-
sure since they are dynamically controlled, and when they are operating, the room airflow changes
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Figure 3.3: Airflow and air pressure control
rapidly. To prevent the cross-contamination, there is still a need for an additional mechanism to
protect and monitor the differential pressure level.
In each laboratory, another control loop, the Cascaded Pressure Control, is applied to monitor
the differential air pressure value and adjust the supply and exhaust airflows, especially during
entering and exiting the room (Figure 3.2). The cascaded pressure control scenario is similar to the
volumetric airflow tracking, but instead of using a fixed offset setpoint for calculating airflows, it also
monitors the differential pressure through differential pressure sensors and uses the air pressure data
to periodically adjust the airflow tracking offset to maintain the laboratory’s differential pressure
at desired level [32].
The chamber controller monitors the differential pressure of all rooms through wired sensors
whereas each laboratory controller manages its own airflows. Periodically the differential pressure
value is sent to each laboratory controller to reset the offset. The differential pressure data is also
sent to a global controller, which is a central control device in a zone deployed for managing and
monitoring control tasks. The global controller constantly audits the differential pressure data to
detect contamination. Additionally, if required, the cascaded pressure control can be equipped to
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monitor the door position sensors. When the door is opened, the door position sensor signals the
laboratory controller to switch to a boost exhaust airflow that is pre-measured within the safe range.
Failing to maintain the differential pressure relationship between rooms and spaces for an
extended period of time is considered a safety violation due to the potential airborne hazard expo-
sure. Either triggered manually by the managers or automatically detected by the global controller
through auditing, the zone will be turned into the decontamination (DECON) mode. In DECON
mode, the amber strobe in every room of the zone will be triggered. Occupants will be required to
exit the zone following the institutional procedures and the access control will be changed to allow
only decontamination experts’ access.
3.1.4 Other Control Tasks
In addition to the airflow and differential pressure control tasks, there are other control tasks
that coexist on the same controllers in a zone.
• Security control task, for enforcing access control policies. Each room is locked through a
self-closing door and only allows authorized occupants to access. The access control system
in each zone is managed by a local security controller and is centrally managed by a physical
access server. In operation mode, occupants are required to badge in and badge out, except
during decontamination mode, when access will be denied until the hazard is decontaminated.
• Interlock control task, for isolating each laboratory. To avoid cross-contamination between
laboratories, every door in the zone is guarded with a magnetic interlock that managed by an
interlock controller. It is programmed to enforce that only one door can open at any time,
except during the fire incident the magnetic interlock will be disabled for personnel’s safety.
• Mode control task, for coordinating different building operation modes. The mode control
is coordinated by the global controller (Network Automation Engine) and room controllers.
There are 4 modes for a zone. the unprovisioned mode, which indicates the initialization
stage of a zone before the physical environment, such as temperature, air pressure reach to
the desired level; the operation mode, which indicates that all laboratories are ready to be
used; the fire mode, which signals fire incident; the decontamination (DECON) mode, which
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is triggered, when there is a procedural violation or the physical environment drops to an
undesired level below threshold.
• Fire alarm control task, for managing fire incident. When a fire incident is being detected, the
local room controller is responsible for responding to the fire mode and turning on the amber
strobe.
• Temperature control task, for managing temperature in each room. This task controls and
monitors the heating coil, the thermostat, and temperature sensor in the room.
The control network for the zone is pictured in Figure 3.2. Each zone is managed relatively
independently by a global controller (NAE in the diagram), which is managed by the Building
Management System (BMS) and Energy Management System (EMS). In the zone, the access control
for all doors is realized by a security controller that managed by the physical access server, while
the interlock control is controlled by a single interlock controller with magnetic interlock actuators,
and door position sensors that applied to every door. Each room has a local controller for all of the
other control tasks with corresponding sensors and actuators. Those controllers communicate with
each other through BACnet protocol.
3.2 Smoke Evacuation Scenario
In contrast to the biocontainment facility scenario, university campus buildings such as li-
braries, residence halls, student centers, etc., are designed to provide easy and comfortable public
access for large groups and to conduct various teaching and research activities. In campus buildings,
isolation of spaces and restriction of unauthorized access are not big concerns. Faculty, staff, and
students spend a substantial amount of their waking hours inside university buildings. Improving
the safety and the comfort level of occupants and the energy efficiency of campus buildings are
among the top priorities of the BASs.
3.2.1 Smoke Evacuation Policies
The main goal of HVAC management for campus building BAS is to efficiently increase the
air exchange. Unlike in the BRI scenario where the supply air is completely from outside air due to
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biosafety considerations, for a campus building, it is more energy efficient to reuse the circulating
air as much as possible. Normally the fresh outside air pulled into the building has to be processed
to remove excess moisture and cooled/heated to a set temperature before being supplied to the
building. Cooling, heating, and dehumidifying the air accounts for a large portion of the total cost
of HVAC operation, especially in the southern U.S. states where the weather tends to be hot and
humid. Therefore, reducing the need of processing outside air by cleaning and re-using the inside
air is an important energy saving technique.
Reusing recirculating air increases the indoor carbon dioxide (CO2) level. CO2 is a natural
component of air. The normal outside atmosphere contains about 300 to 500 parts per million
carbon dioxide [33]. The American Society of Heating, Refrigeration and Air Conditioning Engineers
(ASHRAE) standard recommends 1000–1200 ppm CO2 for indoor sedentary spaces [31]. Elevated
CO2 concentrations can cause drowsiness, lethargy, and sick building syndrome. A recent study
has shown a direct link between indoor carbon dioxide level and cognitive function [34]. Hence,
maintaining a comfortable level of CO2 concentrations in campus buildings, where large groups of
people are constantly exhaling carbon dioxide, is critical.
For high-density occupancy zones, emergency evacuation during fire and smoke is another
challenge. The HVAC management subsystem of BAS is responsible for detecting such incidents,
reducing potential damage, and facilitating the evacuation procedures for public safety and security,
by measures such as opening or unlocking fire exit doors, turning on the fire alarm bullhorns, and
reducing fresh air supply to the area on fire.
3.2.2 Daily Operation
In this university building scenario, there are six controllers – the outside air controller, the
returning air controller, the air handling unit (AHU) controller, the smoke evacuation controller,
and two-floor damper controllers (as shown in Figure 3.4). The HVAC system’s daily operation
sequence is as follows. First, based on the outside temperature and humidity, the building manager
starts the operation in heating or cooling mode with the desired moisture level. When a workday
begins, at the scheduled time the AHU controller will set the system in the occupied mode. The
other controllers periodically (e.g., 5 second cycle) check with AHU controller for the mode change.
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Figure 3.4: HVAC control system
The returning air controller watches the humidity, temperature, CO2 as well as the fire alarm
status. It regulates the return air damper G and opens/closes it according to the manager’s request.
When in occupied mode, the outside air controller is constantly adjusting the outside dampers
(damper B, E, F ) by referring the CO2 sensor data from the returning air controller.
In the occupied mode, the AHU controller processes the air supply. The chilled water control
valve of the cooling coil is maintained at a certain degree based on the sensor feedback and mode
setpoint (e.g., 55F adjustable) to lower humidity from the intake air. The supply fan speed is
automatically regulated through the differential pressure sensor (DP sensor) feedback between the
duct and the hallway. There is also an air filter that helps control dust. A static DP sensor is
equipped between the two sides of the air filter to determine when the filter is clogged enough to
be replaced.
The two-floor damper controllers are deployed in the lower part of the air duct. The floor
damper controllers sense the differential pressure between air duct and floor hallway and use the
feedback to manage inlet guide vanes and damper Ci and Di (i = 1, 2), where C1 and C2 are for
hallway supply, and D1 and D2 are for office supply. The smoke evacuation controller is responsible
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for pulling smoke out of the building. In the occupied mode, the smoke evacuation controller is
usually set in sleep mode.
3.2.3 Smoke Evacuation
During fire and smoke incidents, the fire alarm system is triggered and the AHU controller is
notified. This changes the mode setpoint from the occupied mode to the smoke evacuation mode.
The mode change is then spread to all controllers in the HVAC system. First, the outside controller
will adjust outside air dampers B, E, F to 100% open. The returning air controller will completely
close damper G for preventing smoke recirculation in the building. The supply fan in the air
handler unit will be running in full capacity. The goal is to reduce smoke from spreading to the
entire building while providing adequate oxygenated fresh air for personnel safety.
In the lower part of the duct, the floor damper controllers will open damper Ci to 100% and
completely close damper Di for diverting air supply to the smoke evacuation discharge plenum.
The reason for doing this is to reduce oxygen supply in the office spaces where a fire is most likely
to happen and increase oxygen concentration in hallways to facilitate evacuation. Meanwhile, the
smoke evacuation controller will open the damper H 100% and operate the exhaust fan to pull out
the smoke as much as possible until the fire alarm is turned off either by manual reset or EMS
override.
Analysis of these two scenarios shows that the devil is in the details. BASs are very complex
and data-oriented systems. There are all kinds of analog, digital, and network devices with data from
a variety of sensors. Therefore it is very easy to be overwhelmed and get lost in the technical details.
On the other hand, the interoperability of BAS subsystems makes the design of the integrated
BAS more complicated. Not only are different components interacting with each other through the
control network, but changes in the physical environment also indirectly influence other subsystems’
decision making. For example, change in temperature can cause fluctuation in air pressure, hence
the gauging of differential pressure has to also consider the room temperature. Often the condition
and success of a control task, such as air filter condition or damper opening are indirectly indicated
by the physical status captured by sensors. Additionally, the logic of various control tasks changes
according to the institutional policies under different situations. Errors in control logic and wrong
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assumptions in the BAS can cause serious safety hazards. For example, two mutual contradicting
tasks could be implemented in the mechanisms for detecting decontamination. If implemented
without careful thinking of all possible situations in the BRI scenario, the BAS’s control could
result in contamination never being correctly detected.
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CHAPTER 4: BUILDING AUTOMATION SECURITY ISSUES
The two case studies capture the basic structure, functionality, and requirements of the state-
of-arts BAS. Based on the case studies, this chapter illustrates the abstract logic structure of BAS
control network, and then it analyzes the security issues in each logic layers.
4.1 Building Automation Network
A modern BAS involves a vast amount of communication among all kinds of field devices
and controllers through a layered industrial control network called a Building Automation Network
(BAN). BANs are the backbone of Building Automation Systems. A standard enterprise BAN can
be generally divided into three hierarchical layers. At the bottom is the field level, where small
embedded devices measure and control the physical environment. The field level typically consists
of networked sensors (e.g., motion or temperature sensors) and actuators (e.g., fan, locks, cooling
coils). Devices communicate with each other through wired or wireless signals using protocols such
as LonWorks [35], KNX [36], etc. The middle layer is where automation control is performed.
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs), data acquisition units, and supervisory controllers live in
this level and conduct distributed control tasks through network protocols, such as BACnet [37] and
Modbus [38]. Monitoring and configuration tasks are realized at the management level. This level
is where facility management systems, energy management systems, and cloud-based third parties
integrate together.
Through the BAN, devices meticulously coordinate together to perform the daily operations
of the facility. Buildings come in a variety of sizes and functions; hence the control components in
BAS are highly heterogeneous and often come from various vendors with proprietary communica-
tion solutions (e.g., Johnson Controls N2, Siemens Building Technologies). Those communication
solutions often lack security [13]. Also, due to their long life cycles, BASs often consist of numerous
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legacy subsystems. This diverse range of communication mediums and devices presents a complex
challenge to system-wide security.
4.1.1 Building Automation Network Protocols
Network protocols are the backbone of BAS. The communication protocol BACnet is one
of the most popular protocols in building automation and control networks. BACnet is a protocol
designed by ASHRAE (American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers)
for controlling HVAC systems. BACnet as an open protocol communication standard has been
widely applied to different type of practical systems in many fields, such as HVAC, lighting, life
safety. It is the de facto standard in building automation due to its openness, flexibility, and
interoperability. BACnet as a communication standard supports several different physical and link
layer protocols including PTP, MS/TP, ARCNET, LonTalk, and Ethernet. It can be used to
integrate diverse types of plants and vendors without having to uses special hardware. The protocol
supports poll-response and publish-subscribe communication patterns and services including Who-
is, I-Am, Who-Has, I-Have for device and object discovery. Data inside a BACnet device is organized
as a series of objects. Every piece of information in BACnet is encapsulated within a BACnet
object. Each object has a type and a set of properties. However, the major focus of BACnet lies
on the interoperability and functions, due to historical reason, in practical, BACnet lacks proper
cryptographic support and authentication mechanism.
Besides BACnet, it is also common to see other protocols such as LonMark, Modbus, etc.
LonMark is a networking platform that created to address the needs of control applications. It
is a proprietary communication standard includes multiple protocols in the family developed by
the Echelon Corporation in conjunction with Motorola in the early 1990s. The LonMark standard
is based on the low-level proprietary communications protocol called LonTalk. As a rival proto-
col standard of BACnet, LonTalk offers a different type of solution to the interoperability issue.
LonMark supports different types of transmission media, such as twisted pair cables, power line,
RF, fiber optics or IP (both TCP/IP and UDP/IP). LonTalk requires specialized communications
microprocessor called the Neuron, and together with its supporting software, the protocol estab-
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lishes communication and exchanges information between devices. On top of the LonTalk, another
protocol, LonWorks defines the content and structure of the information that is exchanged.
Another widely used open protocol in building automation is Modbus. The Modbus protocol
was developed during the 1970s by Modicon, Inc. for use in industrial automation systems with
programmable controllers. It is one of the most widely used means for connecting electronic equip-
ment in industrial applications. Modbus supports traditional serial and Ethernet protocols and has
simple, minimum hardware requirements. The benefit of Modbus is that it uses TCP/IP transport
protocol, hence can be easily integrated with the Internet. However, Modbus protocol itself provides
no security against unauthorized commands or interception of data.
Other than those three protocols mentioned above, there are other communication standards
in building automation domain. Some example includes: KNX is an open network communications
protocol for building automation that has been used more than 20 years and supported by hundreds
of vendors. It is widely applied in Europe. DALI is a standardized interface for lighting control.
EnOcean is an energy harvesting wireless technology that used primarily in building automation
systems in response to the smart home concept. It is not uncommon to have more than one protocols
coexist in a building automation system. Different parts of the BAS subsystem especially provided
by different vendors may use different protocols. It is also common to see different layers of the
system use different protocols, e.g., within the HVAC system between master and slave devices,
they might communicate using Modbus, but the communication between automation devices and
management system might use BACnet.
4.1.2 Field Sensors and Actuators in BAS
In the field level of building automation network resides various sensors, and actuators, e.g.,
temperature sensor, air pressure sensor, electricity meter, thermostat, heater, damper, airflow valve
etc. Sensors and actuators were connected to controllers through direct-connected interfaces or
simple field networks, such as, wired field buses that support Twisted Pair (TP) or Powerline (PL)
as network media. The sensors translate analog signals to digital input for controllers. The actuators
take output control signals to adjust physical environment.
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4.1.3 Automation Controllers in BAS
Traditionally Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) play a critical rule in control systems.
A PLC is a digital embedded device used for automation of industrial processes. They perform real-
time control of electromechanical processes. A PLC works by continually scanning a program, which
is called the scan cycle. This involves reading sensor measurements repeatedly, executing control
logic program to calculate output, and actuating output with electromechanical processes. PLCs
are responsible for constantly adjusting physical machinery based on the sensor measurement as well
as functions as a gateway between the machinery and human operators. PLCs translate continuous
analog signals into digital values. Processing is performed using a cycle of input, processing, and
output. The control logic for processing is typically represented using relay ladder logic written
in a graphical language. The most widely used PLC control structure is a Proportional Integral
Derivative (PID) controller. This controller algorithm has three separate constant parameters:
the proportional, the integral, and the derivative values. PID controllers are used to dynamically
adjust output by comparing setpoint (desired value) and actual value of the process variable from
the process under control. However, such control logic can be easily simulated using the software
nowadays.
The trend towards more intelligent controls in BASs necessitates data integration and new
capabilities in the control devices. In order to satisfy the requirement, modern BAS demands more
computing power. New generation embedded controllers running processes with rich functionalities
are replacing PLCs. With the advancement of hardware, many vendors of automation controller
are gradually switching to ARM architecture as their primary computing platform of current and
future building controllers. One example is the Tridium ARM-based JACE controller, a widely used
building automation controller. These devices use an ARM Cortex A8 processor and usually run a
UNIX-like operating system.
Along with software control logic, cloud clients, web server, analytics are often deployed on the
same embedded controllers, which increases the system complexity and makes it prone to potential
vulnerabilities and exploits. Traditional operating systems (OSs) for embedded controllers are sim-
ilar to commercial OSs (e.g., Linux, Windows) which encompass all OS services as privileged-mode
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tasks in kernel space and allocate resources through discretionary access control. Compromising any
code running in privileged-mode (for example device drivers) gives attackers the highest privilege
in a system, thus bypassing any security controls. In order to protect safety-critical building appli-
cations in such mixed-criticality systems, a robust distributed embedded architecture must isolate
applications and regulate local resource usage, so that even when the less critical applications are
compromised by attackers, the critical ones are still functional in a safe way.
4.1.4 Management in BAS
Similar to the Industrial Control System (ICS), BAS may use Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) software to monitor automation facilities. SCADA often is used in distributed
systems for remote monitoring and control that operates over communication networks. A SCADA
performs centralized monitor and control for field sites over long-distance, such as electric power
grids, a university campus, including monitoring alarms and processing status data. Based on
information received from remote devices, supervisory commands either automated or issued by
operators through Human Machine Interface (HMI) can be pushed to remote control devices, which
are often referred to as “field devices”. SCADA servers that are used in BAS often no much different
compared to an IT computer workstation. The majority of SCADA systems using in BAS often
run standard Windows or Linux operating systems with proprietary software on a physical host or
in the virtual infrastructure. Some vendors provide their customized operating system, However,
according to the Guide to Industrial Control System Security from NIST, it is “often without security
capabilities built in” [39]. Nowadays, due to the computing power has dramatically increased and
available at an economically viable price, more powerful automation and supervisory devices have
been deployed in the automation level that provides remote access through a web-based interface. A
typical example is the Metasys solution from Johnson Controls, which have most of the management
functionality in the network automation engine (runs embedded Windows). As a result, BASs starts
to integrate with enterprise IT infrastructure and often managed by the IT teams. Consequently,
BAS controllers are interconnected by a common backbone TCP/IP network through dedicated
gateways and VLANs.
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4.2 Security of Building Automation Network
The current de facto standard BAN protocols, such as BACnet and Modbus, were designed in
the 80’s. They do not support modern security mechanisms, and often do not consider security in
their design [40]. In 2012 the latest BACnet network specification [37] was published, which intro-
duced guideline support for standard cryptographic protection (ANSI/ASHRAE 135-2012 Clause
24). However, talking with vendors we found that even newer BAN devices do not support these
specifications for backward compatibility reasons. As a result, BAS operators have to rely on “air
gaps” and “security by obscurity.” Ostensibly, “air gapped” networks are isolated from outside influ-
ence because they are not connected to outside networks. The Stuxnet attack is a prime example
of this approach failing to defend against attacks that utilize non-network means (e.g., USB drives)
to break the air gap [41] [42]. Furthermore, contrary to common belief, numerous BASs are not
“air gapped” at all [3]. According to the search engine Shodan [43], in the U.S. there are over
50,000 exposed buildings on the Internet that can be directly accessed due to unintended misconfig-
uration [43]. With modern BASs moving towards more intelligent controls that heavily rely upon
communication with the outside world, such air-gapping approach may not even be feasible. Once
the air gap is broken, the whole BAN is vulnerable to attack. As Molina demonstrated at Black Hat
USA 2014, once the attackers find their way into the control network, they can arbitrarily control
the building facility [5].
Many facilities rely upon gateway firewalls for BAN security. Recent years also see much re-
search effort on developing intrusion detection system (IDS) for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) [44],
which share many similarities with BAS. While they add an additional layer of protection, firewalls
and IDS alone are not sufficient. Firewalls must allow certain traffic through and cyber attacks
can be successfully carried through legitimate communication paths. Due to real-time constraints
in most ICS, it is hard to act upon suspicious traffic detected by IDS [45], IDS and firewalls are
necessary to stop a range of attacks with known signatures, but are not sufficient to stop sophisti-
cated attacks without knowing the semantics of various control logic, especially given the fact that
traditionally IDS tends to produce a large amount of false positive [46]. This may be particularly
problematic in a BAS environment where devices are highly heterogeneous. Furthermore, system
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firewalls typically use coarse-grained discretionary access control models. Applications are either
fully allowed or denied the network access based on the identity of the applications. This model is
not sufficient since compromised applications with authorized identity will allow attackers to arbi-
trarily abuse the network resources. The tight integration among subsystems requires fine-grained
access control.
4.3 Security of BAS Controllers
Threats not only come from the network but can also come from software vulnerabilities in
the automation controllers. Study of software reliability shows that industrial software system, in
general, contains 2-75 bugs per 1000 lines of executable code [47], which is considerably higher
than normal code. On the other hand, patching of security vulnerabilities in control systems is
difficult and usually have to wait when maintenance is performed. These issues make control
systems like BAS an attractive target for attackers. Now in light of the advance of CPS, control
systems are highly automated and digitally interconnected with high-level applications and the
Internet. Considering the easy accessibility, poor protection, and potential benefit the hackers can
gain, automation controllers have become the low hanging fruits for cyber attacks. The environment
and assumption of real-time operating systems for BAS has changed. We can no longer confidently
assume that all applications running on top of the OS are benign. For example, with the new setup,
a program with buffer overflow vulnerabilities could possibly allow attackers to inject malicious code
remotely, deceiving the scheduler to plunder CPU time slots, therefore intentionally starving critical
applications, forcing BAS to violate real-time constraints.
Traditionally automation controllers run simple real-time operating systems (RTOSs), al-
though those RTOSs are sufficient, they have mainly focused on build functionalities and real-time
requirement rather than safety and security. Those legacy controllers often lack modern OS features,
such as virtual memory units, and protection rings. Security has been relying on physical separa-
tion, using a different microcontroller for each function. This solution is not expendable. As shown
from the case studies, there are already many microcontrollers for a relatively small scale scenario.
When more and more microcontrollers are deployed in the BAN, the network becomes complex and
hard to manage. They require a lot of cabling, consume a lot of energy, most importantly those
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microcontrollers are not cheap. This problem is compounded by the increasing number of sensors
that must be shared across devices.
Nowadays, modern automation controllers often contain a powerful processor and hosts mul-
tiple control tasks. Those often run commercially operating systems that are very similar to op-
erating systems for general purpose computers, such as embedded Windows, VxWorks, QNX, and
customized Linux etc. Most Commercial OSs are designed based on monolithic kernel architec-
ture. In a monolithic architecture, all OS functions (including interrupt handlers, device drivers,
and system call functions) are implemented as functions in one big kernel binary, runs in the same
address space at the highest privilege level. Therefore, any vulnerabilities in one part of the kernel,
such as a third-party device driver, can allow an attacker to issue any sensitive operations and gain
kernel privilege. Furthermore, the monolithic architecture stuffs all system functionalities in the
same address space, which makes the kernel code bloated. A typical Linux kernel contains over 2
million lines of code. Which makes it impossible to guarantee that reliability of the most impor-
tant component of automation controller, hence jeopardize the safety and security of the building
automation system.
Another important issue that is related to the operating system of automation controller is
the process isolation. In most Unix-like systems, inter-process communication (IPC) is conducted
through either message queues or Unix local sockets, which are all implemented through the file
system. Therefore, the authenticity of the message is protected through file permissions and granted
using role-based discretionary access control. The solution through flexible provides fairly limited
security. If not properly configured, these file system handles could be exploited by adversaries. In
fact, several such recent vulnerabilities have affected both Linux and Android (e.g., CVE-2011-1823,
CVE-2011-3918, CVE-2016-9793). If a process is compromised by attackers, it is possible that the
compromised process might be able to use IPC to interact with peer process and injects spoofing
messages.
On the other hand, traditional Unix-like OSs are built to expose hardware resources for fair
use by applications. Any process has an equal privilege to request services from device drivers.
To conduct network communication, processes can open ports by simply requesting a socket and
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writing to a memory mapped file. In essence, any compromised processes can send out outbound
communication and conduct DoS attacks on the network. Moreover, if a malicious process gains
more privilege, it can control the whole device and arbitrarily manipulate the inbound and outbound
network traffic. In contrast to general purpose computing platforms, embedded devices such as BAS
controllers often co-hosts applications with mixed criticality and various real-time requirements.
Constructing such systems using the traditional OS resource sharing model will create situations
where compromised processes in BASs can easily abuse network resources and spread malware
throughout a network [48]. Recent massive DDoS attacks that utilized compromised IoT botnets
are emblematic examples of this problem [49, 50]. From both safety and security perspectives, in
safety-critical systems network communication should be a privileged operation.
4.4 Security of BAS Management
The management system for building automation system is very similar to a enterprise IT
system. Hence, the security threats are also similar to IT system. First, servers are often prone to
computer viruses and backdoors. Many BAS management engines run embedded Windows due to
vulnerabilities in software and system service. Control systems have a high-reliability requirement,
it is easy to oversee the system update and apply software patches.
On the other hand, modern BAS management system often supports web-based interface
and can be accessed through a browser. If not configured properly the system is vulnerable to
typical web-based attacks. For example, if the certificate of the web server is not set up correctly
attackers can conduct eavesdropping, man-in-middle attacks, and other common Internet attacks.
Furthermore, for convenience, many system administrators set up remote access in BAS manage-
ment network. Although such network access often protected by VLAN, VPN, etc., if there are
misconfigurations in networks or the administrators had weak passwords, it is possible to expose
weak point and allow attacks to gain access. Last but not least, the authentication between client
and BAS server is critical. High-profile system breaches often start from compromising password
either through exploiting the system, such as weak password cracking, authentication bypass or
through exploiting the users, such as phishing attacks and other social engineering methods.
29
4.5 BAS Threat Summary
Based on the discussion above the security issues of modern building automation system can
be categorized as the following three attack surfaces:
• Attack on the management system
• Attack on the internal network and protocol
• Attack on automation controllers and field devices
And for each surface, known potential threats are summarized as shown on table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Known potential threats
Threats on Management
System
Threats on Building
Automation Network
Threats on Automation
Controller
1. Backdoor and Virus
2. Vulnerabilities in Common
Protocols
- Communication Hijacking
- Man-in-the-Middle Attack
- Network Spoofing Attack
3. Denial of Service
4. Eavesdropping
5. Attack on Software and
Service Vulnerabilities
6. Insider Threats
7. Social Engineering
1. Network Sniffing
(Interception)
2. Network Spoofing Attack
(Fabrication)
- Insert Malformed Data
- Insert Fake Commands
3. Network Replay Attack
4. Man-in-the-Middle Attack
(Modification)
5. Denial-of-Service Attack
(Interruption)
6. Byzantine attack
1. Physical Tampering
2. Password Cracking
3. Deception Attack
- Replay Attack
- Device Impersonation
4. Network Attack
5. Privilege Escalation
6. IPC False Data Injection
7. Rootkit
8. Bogus Command
9. Resource Monopoly Attack
10. Resource Consumption
Attack
11. Code Injection
12. Exploit Algorithm
Weakness
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CHAPTER 5: DESIGN OVERVIEW 1
In an effort to address the aforementioned security issues, this work focuses on the design of a
robust computing platform that follows security-by-design principle to mitigate the aforementioned
problems at the root. For a robust computing platform to support a mixed-criticality system, the
design boils down to isolation, authenticity, and secure communication. A computing platform can
be viewed as a layered architecture. The bottom layer is the hardware; the middle layer is kernel; the
top layer is the user interface and runtime environment. In the traditional approach to embedded
systems, all of those layers are part of the trusted computing base (TCB), which means that they
are critical to system security [52]. If we want to create a secure platform, we need to make sure all
of those elements are secure. That is a huge portion of a system to secure considering the lines of
code involved. Therefore, this work chooses the alternative microkernel architecture with minimal
TCB as the core technology. This chapter documents some of the choices of the design rationale.
5.1 Microkernel Architecture
In modern software, it is fair to say that operating systems are the core of any computing
system. Bridging the boundary between hardware and software, OSs manage hardware and physical
resources, such as memory, peripheral, processor usage, and energy, etc. for isolation and collab-
oration. From an application’s perspective, OS abstracts the complex details of various hardware
mechanisms away and provides services through easy-to-use interfaces. Hence, the security and sta-
bility of a system greatly rely on the robustness and security of the operating system. The heart of
an operating system is called a kernel. A kernel is the first program executed in a system. Running
in the most privileged mode, it is responsible for initializing the platform and bootstrapping other
services.
1Part of this chapter is published in IEEE International workshop on Communication, Computing, and Networking
in Cyber Physical Systems (CCNCPS 2017) [51] paper. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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5.1.1 Microkernel History
Generally speaking, there are two main kernel architectures, the monolithic kernel architecture
and the microkernel architecture. Microkernel was first proposed in the 1970’s. Designed by Per
Brinch Hansen, the Nucleus real-time OS is considered to be the root of microkernel [53]. Being a
minimalistic system, Nucleus features inter-process communication primitives using message passing
and process control, and dedicates I/O, scheduling to external processes. Following Hansen’s work,
microkernel became a very appealing solution in response to the existing security and reliability
challenges in the monolithic kernel-based operating systems. Historically, Mach is considered as one
of the classic examples of the first generation microkernel. Originally intended to be a replacement
of monolithic UNIX kernel, Mach was designed with a simplified kernel structure with a small set
of functionalities in the kernel space that concentrate on inter-process communication. Although
the legacy of Mach still lives in many modern operating systems, such as GNU Hurd, and Apple’s
MacOS, Mach failed to replace UNIX due to the performance impacts caused by the frequent
context switch between kernel and user processes. During this period of time, many experimental
microkernels emerged, some of the notable ones being MINIX, QNX, AmigaOS that are still under
active development.
For a long time, the term microkernel has been associated with poor performance. However,
this perception is not necessarily true. In fact, issues with performance are not inherent in micro-
kernel architecture, but are due to the complicity of existing design choices. For example, many
microkernels provide both synchronous and asynchronous IPCs and support more than 100 system
calls in order to be compatible with the UNIX system. Later on, as proven by Liedtke, the first
L4 microkernel shows that microkernels do not have to be slow. Written in assembly code and
specifically focused on high performance, he improved the IPC by making it 20 times faster than
Mach’s [54]. Liedtke formulated his famous minimality principle stating, “A concept is tolerated
inside the microkernel only if moving it outside the kernel, i.e.,, permitting competing implemen-
tations, would prevent the implementation of the system’s required functionality.” [55]. Since the
success of the first generation of L4 microkernel, many L4 family microkernels have emerged in
both academic experimental and commercial deployments. Those implementations include but are
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not limited to: L4::Hazelnut, which is a proof-of-concept microkernel constructed in high-level lan-
guage C++ [56]. L4/Fiasco, which is designed to support hard real-time and focuses to achieve low
interrupt latency. L4Ka::Pistachio, which supports multiprocessor [57]. Most especially, NICTA
(now Data61) released a third-generation microkernel, called seL4. SeL4 is the first formally ver-
ified microkernel in the world that focuses on high assurance and reliability. Recently, with the
advancement in hardware and the increasing concern of security, the idea of microkernel has made
a second comeback, as many experimental microkernel-based OSs, such as Redox, KasperskyOS,
NOVA, L4Re have been proposed.
5.1.2 Microkernel Design
Microkernel’s design matches the principle of least privilege in information security (the struc-
ture of microkernel as shown in Figure 5.1). Contrary to monolithic kernel architecture, where all
OS services and drivers are executed in the kernel address space, Microkernel architecture is de-
signed in a modular flexible structure. In a typical microkernel-based operating systems, the kernel
only handles low-level functionality and process primitives, such as low-level address management,
hardware interrupts process control blocks (PCBs), and IPC. All other OS system services, such
as file system, virtual memory management, network stack, and device drivers that traditionally
resides in the kernel space, are removed from the kernel and running as processes in the user mode.
The architecture is more robust compared to the monolithic kernel approach. This is caused by the
reduced size of code running in privileged mode, which dramatically minimizes catastrophic errors.
Furthermore, all processes in user mode lack the authority to directly access memory that doesn’t
belong to those processes, thus they are well isolated.
In microkernel architecture, inter-process communication is the backbone. Different to the
monolithic kernel, where all system functions reside in the most privileged processor mode, different
parts of the system can directly invoke each other through a function call. Microkernel is organized
through IPC invoked remote procedure call. Because different services are running in isolated
memory space, data is explicitly passed through either registers or shared memory.
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Figure 5.1: Microekernel vs. monolithic kernel
5.1.3 Microkernel Security Benefits
The motivation that drives the design choice of the microkernel is how we view the kernel. Tra-
ditionally, the kernel has been viewed as the central decision maker that aims to manage resources,
hides hardware complexity, and provides fair services as efficient as possible with the assumption
that every piece of code is benign. With every system services running in the kernel space, the
result is a bloated monolithic kernel. This review is not practical, as we know that from device
drivers to file system, each component of the system can contain vulnerabilities. As Tanenbaum
pointed out [58], current operating systems are complex software. The Linux kernel has over 2.5
million lines of code (LOC) and Windows systems are even larger. It is impossible to guarantee
the functional correctness of a monolithic kernel. The microkernel structure extenuates the kernel’s
responsibility, and views kernel as the organizer, similar to the functionality of a Switch on network,
that only provides communication mechanisms to loosely couple different modules.
This structure provides the following outstanding benefits compared to the monolithic kernel
structure. First, isolates system services and device drivers dramatically reduce the potential of a
security breach in the kernel space. It is well-known that device drivers have error rates 3 to 7 times
higher than other code [59]. In general-purpose OSs, device drivers contribute to a large percentage
of vulnerabilities. In monolithic kernel architecture, compromises device drivers will give attackers
the highest privilege, while in the microkernel device drivers are user space processes; unless the
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kernel is compromised the breach is well-confined within the vulnerable processes. Exploits of driver
code won’t lead to privilege escalations and the rest of the functionality remains intact.
Second, microkernels are more robust against failures, due to the reduced size of the code
in the kernel space. The functional correctness has a lot to do with the kernel’s size. A typical
microkernel consists about 4000 - 6000 lines of code. The small code size in microkernel makes it easy
to audit the code. As shown by seL4, it is even possible to apply formal verification to its code base
and mathematically prove the specification and implementation [60]. Furthermore, microkernels
generally do not dynamically allocate memory. This dramatically reduces the probability of memory-
based attacks such as buffer overflow and use-after-free exploits in the kernel space. Finally, the
microkernel’s unique modularity guarantees process isolation and ensures that there is only one way
to communicate between different processes [61]. The only inter-process communication (IPC) in a
microkernel system is via kernel primitives such as message passing. From the security perspective,
this makes it easy for developers to monitor process behaviors, system calls etc. and detects potential
exploits. Also, because of this exclusivity, the kernel is in a unique position to allow, deny, or
otherwise referee all communication. Compared to a monolithic OS, all functions in the OS are
executed on behalf of the user process and no process switching takes place. It is hard to keep track
these function calls once the control is transferred to the kernel.
5.2 Mandatory Access Control
In a microkernel architecture, user-space subsystems and components are modularized into
isolated processes. The inter-process communication (IPC) under microkernel architecture is similar
to communication in distributed networks, where the kernel behaves like a router. For processes to
send data or signal across memory space, the processes must use kernel primitive, message passing.
Because of this exclusivity, the kernel is in a unique position to allow, deny, or otherwise referee
all IPC. On the other hand, in embedded systems IPC generally follows predefined patterns among
user-space processes. By regulating the use of IPC primitives, the kernel arbitrates the interaction
among isolated processes. It can enforce customized control policies for all data flows based on a
system specification. Thus, to enforce the communication policy for mixed-criticality systems, the
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design of an access control mechanism to regulate the IPC in microkernel architecture is an ideal
solution. This work follows such an approach.
A common IPC primitive in microkernel architectures is synchronous message passing. Using
a system call, a process requests the kernel to send or receive a message; at this point, the kernel can
determine the validity and authenticity of this request on the basis of pre-defined IPC policies. Once
the message is validated, the kernel transfers the message across address-space boundaries through
dedicated registers and memory. In addition, the kernel appends metadata with the source and
destination information which cannot be forged. Because virtual memory mapping is also overseen
by the kernel, shared memory between processes can likewise be subject to the pre-defined policy. By
regulating the use of IPC primitives, the kernel arbitrates the interaction among isolated processes.
It can enforce customized control policies for all data flows based on a system specification.
Taking advantage of the aforementioned unique feature in the microkernel architecture, this
work applies mandatory access control to the message passing mechanism. Mandatory access control
is a system-wide policy enforcement mechanism. Different from discretionary access control which is
widely implemented in commercial OSs that let users decide the access control policies on their data
regardless of global policies, mandatory access control is globally enforced and cannot be altered
by users or applications themselves. In this work, the fine-grained mandatory access control is
implemented as kernel module called Access Control Matrix (ACM) and only resides in the kernel
space, which is inaccessible from user space hence it is immune from potential attack as long as the
kernel is trustworthy.
5.3 Proxy-based Network Communication
Another part of the system that needs to be regulated is the network communication. Contrary
to the general purpose OSs, in which the systems focus on providing fair service to all processes, in
a mixed-criticality embedded systems network access should be treated as a privilege and only be
granted to an application if it is needed to achieve its functionality. This is because in a complex
distributed system many controllers cooperate together for a control task. A compromised process
can open ports by simply requesting a socket, and spoof or conduct DoS attacks to other critical
applications on the other devices.
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Constraining network resources of a subset of processes are not trivial in the general purpose
OSs due to the monolithic kernel architecture. However, it is easy to achieve under the microker-
nel architecture especially with the ACM mechanism, because in microkernel architectures system
services and device drivers are running as user processes, and system calls use the kernel IPC prim-
itives in the same way. Hence, to extend the policies with network communication control, this
design deprives processes’ capability to communicate with network services, by default using ACM.
For applications that need network access, this design applies the proxy pattern by introducing a
lightweight special proxy process for applications with network communication requirements. Proxy
pattern is a well-known software design pattern. In essence, proxy design pattern decouples appli-
cation control logic and interface in an attempt to provide a surrogate for access and protect the
control components from undue complexity. In this work, a proxy process is a local delegate for a
remote process on a separate controller. All network communication to remote processes is routed
through dedicated proxies (one-to-one) via IPC, allowing IPC policy to dictate valid remote com-
munication. When BAS control processes need to use the network, the traffic is forwarded by a
dedicated light-weight proxy process. During this process, the kernel vets the IPC request accord-
ing to specific application communication policy. Figure 5.2 demonstrates a simple two-controller,
two-process example of this framework. Aproxy_2 is a proxy for Process A and Bproxy_1 is a proxy
for Process B. Process A sends messages to Bproxy_1, which forwards the traffic across the network
to Aproxy_2, which scrutinizes and forwards the message to Process B.
Controller 1
Microkernel
Controller 2
Process B
Controller 1 Kernel checks policy: 
A→B: allowed
Policy Enforcement
Process A Bproxy_1
Controller 2 Kernel checks policy: 
A→B: allowed
Aproxy_2
Microkernel Policy Enforcement
Figure 5.2: Each controller enforces global policy locally, allowing process A to communicate with
process B over remote proxies
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On the other hand, building automation network security is two-fold. The lack of authentica-
tion and encryption in communication protocols, such as BACnet and Modbus have a big impact on
building automation network security. Even if all trustworthy devices are restricted with network
access, there is nothing to stop attackers from plugging malicious devices into the network through
physical access. This problem is non-trivial. Although it is feasible to develop new protocols with
built-in strong authentication and state-of-arts encryption algorithms, it is not likely to be applied in
practice due to the compatibility consideration with existing legacy devices and systems. In fact, the
latest BACnet network specification [37] introduces guideline support for standard cryptographic
protection (ANSI/ASHRAE 135-2012 Clause 24). However, talking with vendors we found that
even newer BAN devices do not support these specifications for backward compatibility reasons.
In order to provide a solution that is compatible with existing BAS, but also has the capability
to protect those critical control tasks and devices from potential attacks, this work relies upon the
deployment of paired proxies. Since each network communication has a pair of proxies deployed on
both ends, the proxy pair can negotiate security tunnels in the application layer regardless of the
communication protocol and authenticate each other. The data would flow from a BAS process to
a proxy process via IPC; then it would be encrypted and forwarded to the network driver. The
receiving controller would forward incoming traffic to the listening proxy, which then decrypts and
dispatches the message to the destination BAS process through IPC.
Following the philosophy of proxy design pattern as well as adding encryption through tun-
neling, we expect the following benefits of both these design features (proxies and tunneling) for
our framework:
1. It isolates control logic and regulates usage of network resources. Compromised applications
cannot monopolize the network, and incoming network threats will first be vetted by the
communication framework.
2. It separates control functions from communications. Network communication becomes trans-
parent for applications, which can then be redeployed to independent devices without worrying
about interconnectivity.
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3. It shields critical applications from direct network exposure and allows system designers to
specify application-layer policies. Rather than simply forward network packets from/to pro-
cesses, various domain-specific rules can be inserted in the kernel for scrutinizing incom-
ing/outgoing information.
4. It enables system designers to consider security in the design phase at a high-level. The
framework maps system-wide access control to local access control in multiple devices.
5. It guarantees end-to-end security even in complex BAN environments where diverse protocols
and legacy devices are deployed. All communication can be encrypted based on the negotiation
of the pair of dedicated proxies and tunneled through standard control protocols, such as
BACnet and Modbus.
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CHAPTER 6: IMPLEMENTATION
This chapter discusses the implementation details of the aforementioned design. For the
prototype, this work chooses two mature microkernels as the development platforms, MINIX 3 and
seL4. Through investigation, the ARM architecture stands out as the primary computing platform
of current and future building controllers. One example is the ARM-based JACE controller, a
widely used building automation controller. The implementation is targeted on a development
board, BeagleBone Black. The BeagleBone Black uses a TI AM335x ARM Cortex A8 chip (1GHz),
equipped with 512 MB of DDR3 RAM, and has a host of physical interfaces.
6.1 MINIX 3 Microkernel
MINIX is a well-known microkernel-based OS that is designed to exemplify the microkernel
approach [62]. The latest version is MINIX 3, which is aimed for embedded devices with a focus
on high reliability. From the user’s point of view, MINIX 3 looks very much like a traditional
UNIX-style system. In fact, most libc and NetBSD userland applications have been ported into
MINIX 3. However, the architecture of MINIX 3 is totally different from traditional systems that
are driven by a typical microkernel. The kernel of MINIX 3 is only about 6,000 lines of code.
The kernel code contains hardware abstractions, interrupts, process control blocks (PCBs), timers,
and IPC primitives. The OS is built in three layers: the device driver layer, system service layer,
and user application layer. On top of device drivers, MINIX 3 consists of multiple servers running
as isolated user space processes including, process manager, virtual file system, virtual memory
manager, system information service, device manager, etc. MINIX 3 is the most mature open-
source microkernel-based OS with the most device driver support. For those reasons, I use it as one
of the platforms to develop the prototype.
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6.2 The seL4 Microkernel
The seL4 is the latest member of the L4 microkernel family. Following the L4 kernel philos-
ophy, the seL4 kernel supports abstractions for virtual address spaces, threads and inter-process
communication with high performance. Most importantly, seL4 is the first mathematically verified
software kernel [63]. Implemented and verified by the University of South Wales and NICTA, the
formal verification proofs the executable machine code compiled from seL4’s 10,000+ lines of code
is functionally correct against its high-level specification (through theorem prover), which implies
that the kernel code is free of vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, undefined behaviors etc.
Different from MINIX 3 and traditional Unix-like system, seL4 uses the capability-based
security model. From the kernel’s point of view, resources are viewed as different types of kernel
objects. The ownership or access rights of a kernel object (e.g., unused memory regions, page
tables, task control blocks, IPC endpoints, etc.) is accounted by capabilities. Capability-based
access control directly ties to the virtual memory management through MMU. A capability is an
unforgeable token that represents the owner’s explicit authority and directly managed by the kernel.
This model provides a flexible mechanism for reasoning and enforcing the control policies.
6.3 Implementation of Access Control Matrix
In MINIX 3, kernel IPC primitive is synchronous message passing. The synchronous message
passing uses a rendezvous-style mechanism. When the IPC primitives are called, the calling process
will be suspended until the message is copied from the sender to receiver. The messages are fixed-
size 64-byte buffers, which includes a 4-byte endpoint identifier, a 4-byte message type field, and
56-byte payload. A destination endpoint has to be explicitly supplied to send or receive a message.
An endpoint identifies a process uniquely among the operating system. It is composed of the
process slot number concatenated with a generation number for IPC addressing which is stored in
the process control block. There are 3 system calls: ipc_send() ipc_receive(), and ipc_sendrec().
The ipc_send() system calls block until the message is delivered to the receiving process. The
ipc_receive() system calls block until the message is received from the target process. The ipc_-
sendrec() is an atomic operation for a round trip send and receive communication. In the current
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version, synchronous message passing is reserved for device drivers and system server components
with designed communication protocols.
The MINIX 3 IPC primitives provide an effective vehicle to implement the policy-enforced
mandatory access control for process isolation and communication regulation. This work modifies
the MINIX 3 kernel to bring the message passing primitives to all user processes. Because the
kernel facilitates all of the IPC, it is the ideal location to enforce IPC policy. By directly exposing
the IPC primitives to all user processes, we also simplify the communication paths and information
flow. Additionally, I added three system calls in the process management server for improving IPC
related operations. The getendpoint(pid), which translates a process ID and returns the correspond-
ing endpoint; getendpoint_name(proc_name), which retrieves process’s endpoint by name; select()
system calls that allows process to query all the pending messages.
Secondly, I modified PCB data structure, to add a field called access control ID (ac_id) and
related system calls: fork2(), and srv_fork2(). Those system calls can assign each process, server,
a unique number during booting period. They are designed to replace the original fork(), and
srv_fork() system calls for loading process and system servers with specified ac_id. Process IDs
are randomly assigned and can change, so we needed this ac_id to assist building definitions of
IPC policy. We use the added ac_id field to uniquely identify each process and enforce the control
policy.
Finally, I implemented the policy checking mechanism, Access Control Matrix (ACM) in the
message passing primitive. The kernel now checks the ACM for each IPC to determine if the two
processes are allowed to communicate. As the only code running in privileged mode, the kernel has
the absolute authority over IPC. Because the ACM is stored in kernel space, it cannot be easily
modified without recompiling the kernel source code. Thus, correct implementation of the ACM in
kernel space can guarantee the enforcement of mandatory security checking.
As the name suggests, the ACM is a tabular data structure. The ACM using a sparse matrix
data structure for fast lookup and space efficiency. Each ac_id indicates an index entry in the
matrix. Each row in the matrix defines which processes the sending process can communicate
with through message passing, and what type of message is allowed. A message type is a number
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indicating what type of communication is allowed. The interpretation of message type is reserved
for the individual processes and it is assumed by the kernel that it is pre-negotiated between the
sender and receiver. In our experiment, we use the message type field to represent different remote
procedure calls a certain process provides to the other process to invoke.
To explain how the mechanism functions, a simple example is illustrated in Figure 6.1. There
are three processes in the example, App1, App2, and App3, two of which provide public remote pro-
cedure calls (RPCs). For App1 the RPCs app1_f1(), app1_f2(), and app1_f3(), are represented by
message types 1, 2, 3 respectively. App3 also provides three RPCs like App1; App2 has no publicly
available procedures. For all processes, message type 0 is reserved to indicate an acknowledgment
to the caller.
App1 App2
App3
ac_id = 100 ac_id = 101
ac_id = 102
100
101
102
…
…
Access Control Matrix
1101
100
0
101
0111
102
0
100
0001
101
1011
102
0011
100
0011
101
0
102
m_type: 
0, 1, 3
m_type: 
0, 1
m_type: 
0, 2, 3
m_type: 
0
m_type: 
0, 1, 2
m_type: 
0, 1
App1 m_type: 
0 = ACKNOWLEDGE
1 = function call app1_f1()
2 = function call app1_f2()
3 = function call app1_f3()
App3 m_type: 
0 = ACKNOWLEDGE
1 = function call app3_f1()
2 = function call app3_f2()
3 = function call app3_f3()
App2 m_type: 
0 = ACKNOWLEDGE
1 = not supported
2 = not supported
3 = not supported
Figure 6.1: Fine-grained IPC using access control matrix
We want to allow App2 access to App1’s app1_f2(), app1_f3() functions, and we want app1_-
f1() only be invoked by App3. We want all confirm messages between processes be allowed. With
this example model, we can define the ACM as shown in the figure and compile this matrix together
with kernel binary. During runtime, the kernel will use the ACM to audit the information flow.
Suppose App2 tries to send a message with message type 2 to App1. The kernel will lookup the
App1’s and App2’s ac_id in the ACM. Since the bitmap is defined as 1101 the message will be
allowed. On the other hand, if the message type is 1 the message will be denied and the request
will be dropped instead.
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6.4 Implementation of Proxy Framework and Security Tunneling
With ACM, the proxy design can be easily implemented. By default, all processes are blocked
from network communications. This is done by restricting IPC communication between processes
and network servers. In the MINIX 3 prototype, a proxy is assigned the same ac_id as the remote
process its delegate. Hence, it is being subject to the same ACM policy. This allows a common,
unified ACM policy to be distributed to all kernels in the controllers on the network. By using the
same ACM policy among all controllers, processes can be migrated to different controllers but still
provide the same level of regulated isolation and integration. This way, global security enforcement
can be done in a completely distributed manner on each local controller. From the system’s point
of view, the information flow is between process A and proxy process Bproxy_1, which is conveyed
by kernel IPC primitives, which are subjected to the ACM. Therefore we map the remote IPC to
local IPC, to which we can enforce policies.
By using proxies, we can effectively reduce the potential risks caused by malicious internal
processes. However, another set of attack vectors for BAS devices are common network attacks, such
as man-in-the-middle attacks, DDoS attacks, sniffing attacks, spoofing attacks, etc.. For example,
if an outside malicious device gains access to the networking medium, that device isn’t subject to
any microkernel policy, therefore posing a threat to the BAN. Furthermore, BANs often involve
multiple industrial control protocols at the same time which are often vendor dependent. The
complexity and dependency of BAS make it impossible to switch to secure protocols in practice.
A more practical solution would be to provide a VPN-like secure network tunnel between devices
on the BANs through authentication and encryption mechanisms in the application layer. This is
a well-studied problem in computer networks; protocols such as TLS have been widely used on the
Internet and enterprise networks. Although, using proxy-based communication provides an ideal
medium to establish secure network tunnels on an application-to-application basis. In the proposed
framework, we use pre-distributed public/private key pair in proxies. A symmetric session key is
negotiated between proxy pairs using their asymmetric key pair through standard Diffie-Hellman
key exchange algorithm [64].
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This solution can be extended with special cryptographic hardware support, such as using
a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to provide a stronger chain-of-trust. For example, with TPM
support an authorized root key pair with a certificate can be stored the TPM hardware. A TPM
driver could be used to provide service for proxy processes for key derivation, data sealing, and
other cryptographic functionality. In that case, asymmetric key pairs for proxies can be derived at
runtime and the proxies will never need to store keys in nonvolatile memory.
Adding all these lightweight proxy processes allow system mapping network communication
into local IPC, and enables the microkernel to regulate the inter-device IPCs through arbitrating
local IPCs between local process and proxy using ACM policies. Global security is obtained by
uniform local security checks enforced in the lowest layer in each device.
When a process sends a message to the proxy, the communication conduct the following logic
steps:
1. BAS control processes issue ipc_send() or ipc_sendrec() to initiate communication.
2. The request is trapped into the kernel, the kernel verifies the validity of this communication
against ACM.
3. the kernel forwards the message to the waiting proxy.
4. The proxy receives the message through ipc_receive().
5. The proxy checks the validity of the application specific message content.
6. The proxy encrypts and forwards the outgoing message to the network server.
7. The proxy replies to the BAS control process indicating the message was sent.
To transfer a large amount of data, shared memory can be used. MINIX 3 supports system
V shared memory operations, shmat(), shmgdt(). But the implementation is realized using the
userland process IPC server. To set up shared memory, processes communicate with the IPC server
using message passing. This work modified the IPC server to fit the policy enforcement. Processes
that initialize shared memory explicitly specifies the process endpoint who are able to access this
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memory segment. Successfully creating the shared memory segment returns a random secret key.
The process can pass the secret key to the target peer using standard IPC which can only happen
if they are allowed to communicate. Only the explicit specified process with the random secret key
can attach the shared memory. The way the shared memory is also mediated by ACM.
6.5 An Illustrative Example
An illustration of how the system works in a distributed environment is provided by the
following example, as shown in Figure 6.2. Assume in a control scenario that involves three devices,
Controller A, Controller B, and Controller C. Controller A hosts a client process C1, Controller
B hosts a server process S1, and Controller C hosts a server process S2 and a client process C2.
Client process C1 requests service from both server processes S1 and S2. Client process C2, a
legacy process, requests service from the local server process S2.
Using the proposed application communication framework we deploy server proxies, S1proxy_A
and S2proxy_A, on Controller A on behalf of S1 and S2 respectively. On Controller B we deploy
a client proxy, C1proxy_B, on behalf of C1. Similarly, for communication between S2 and C1 on
Controller C a client proxy, C1proxy_C is deployed. Additionally, because C2 is a legacy process
it poses potential security risks for other control processes, so C2 will be installed in the untrusted
partition. Direct communication between S2 and C2 will be prohibited, and a cross-partition proxy
C2trusted_proxy will be deployed. On each controller, the communication policy is enforced through
OS policy enforcement primitive (ACM in security-enhanced MINIX 3) and (capability in seL4) in
the kernel. The remote proxies share the same access control ID as the corresponding processes
they represent. Those proxies are assumed to be trusted and have access privilege to the network
infrastructure services.
When client C1 needs service from server S1 (either for data sharing or invoking remote
procedure calls), an IPC will be issued in the form of message passing. From C1’s point of view the
message is sent to server S1, but actually the message will first be vetted by the kernel according to
policy and then sent to proxy S1proxy_A. The proxy then forwards the message to proxy C1proxy_B
through the network using a secure network tunnel between those two proxies. Eventually, the proxy
C1proxy_B forwards the authenticated and decrypted the message to process S1. The reply follows
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the same route. A similar procedure applies to communication between client process C2, proxy
C2trusted_proxy, and server process S2 locally on Controller C.
We assign the same access control ID as server process S1 to proxy S1proxy_A (the proxy
working on behalf of process S1 on Controller A). This allows a common, unified ACM policy to
be distributed to all kernels in the controllers on the network. By using the same ACM policy
among all controllers, processes can be migrated to different controllers but still provide the same
level of regulated isolation and integration. This way, global security enforcement can be done in a
completely distributed manner on each local controller.
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Figure 6.2: Three devices, four process scenario demonstrating the usage of cryptographic tunneling
between the proxies
The prototype using seL4 microkernel has similar implementation and achieve the same goal.
Thanks to the capability-based access control model, the seL4 microkernel already has strong manda-
tory access control enforcement. No modification in the kernel space is needed. The policy is realized
in the form of endpoint capability distribution, which happens in the root (init) user process. The
proxy-based network communication works the same way. The development of the seL4 prototype
is lead by Richard and the detailed information is documented in [65]. This shows that the chosen
design works well with microkernel architecture in general.
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CHAPTER 7: EVALUATION
This chapter explains the experiment I conducted using the security-enhanced MINIX 3 pro-
totype. These experiments are designed to evaluate the system security, the effectiveness of the
proposed solution, as well as performance in comparison with an unmodified microkernel, as well
as the widely applied Linux. The following sections are organized as three steps: (1) introduction
of the scenario; (2) threat model and security analysis; (3) performance analysis.
7.1 Temperature Control Scenario
In order to evaluate the design in a realistic way that simulates a realistic use case that
captures the gist of building automation system operations. I developed two temperature control
scenarios based on the case study of a biological research laboratory HVAC system.
7.1.1 Single-device Temperature Control Scenario
The first scenario is a single-controller control scenario. The goal of the scenario is to maintain
the laboratory temperature within the desired range. Failed to maintain the laboratory temperature
within the extended time will trigger an alarm. Administrators can monitor the control environment
status, and adjust the desired laboratory temperature from a web portal. The logic structure of the
simple scenario is represented in Figure 7.1.
Following the implementation of the prototype, this experiment uses the BeagleBone Black to
simulate the building controller. The temperature sensor chooses the BMP180 barometric pressure
sensor, which can measure both air pressure and temperature. The heater actuator is simply a fan
actuator together with a small electrical heating mat for emulation. For the alarm actuator, I use
the onboard LED light instead. The controlled environment is represented using a 3D printed PVC
container. The container includes two partitions. One is used to simulate the laboratory. The other
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Figure 7.1: Single device temperature control scenario logic structure
is used to simulate the HVAC room, where the fan is mounted. The airflow from HVAC room to
the laboratory. Figure 7.2 shows the our testbed implementation.
The control task is realized in five processes, temperature sensor driver, fan actuator driver,
alarm actuator driver, temperature control process, and webinterface process respectively (Fig-
ure 7.3). Each process communicates via synchronous message passing. Additionally, each process
has a set of predefined message types it accepts, while the ACM mechanism restrains which kind of
message types can be sent from which process. The temperature sensor process periodically samples
the environment temperature and sends the fresh data using nonblocking send system call to the
temperature control process. Both the alarm actuator process and the fan actuator process are im-
plemented to passively wait for commands from temperature control process. Lastly, the webinterface
process acts as a basic human-machine interface. It is a static HTTP web server with 5 fixed child
threads. The process maintains TCP socket on port 8080 and supports HTTP GET and HTTP
POST. In the scenario, the most important process is the temperature control process. When the
process starts, it executes the initialize function to retrieve endpoint of each process it needs to
communicate with. Then the process enters a while loop, waiting for the new sensor data from
temperature sensor process. When data arrives, the sensor data will be compared with temperature
setpoint to decide whether to turn on or turn off the fan, meanwhile, a timer will be checked if the
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Figure 7.2: Temperature control testbed
temperature is out of the range of the setpoint. If within a certain time the temperature control
fails to maintain the range within the setpoint, the alarm will be triggered. Then the process will
check if there are pending messages from web interface process for updating new setpoint. At the
end of the while loop, environment information will be written in a log file.
7.1.2 Network-based Temperature Control Scenario
The second experiment is a multiple-device temperature control scenario. Similar to the
former example the goal of this control task is to regulate the temperature of the laboratory. In
an effort to make the simulation realistically reflexing BAS, and test the network security of the
platform, this temperature control scheme is implemented in controllers. Controller A represents
the building controller and hosts the webinterface process, temperature control process, and alarm
actuator driver. Controller B represents the Air Handler Unit, and hosts the temperature sensor
driver, and fan actuator driver as shown in Figure 7.4.
Between those processes that communicate through the network, proxy pairs with pre-distributed
public/private key pairs. Those proxies includes temperature control proxy in Controller B, webin-
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Figure 7.3: Single device temperature control scenario process communication
Figure 7.4: Multiple device temperature control scenario logic structure
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Figure 7.5: Single device temperature control scenario process communication
terface proxy, temperature sensor proxy, and fan actuator proxy in Controller A. This logic process
communication is shown in Figure 7.5.
7.1.3 Implementation using Linux
The implementation on Linux is very similar to the implementation on MINIX 3. The only
major difference is that on Linux the interprocess communication is conducted through POSIX
message queues. Message queues provide an asynchronous communication protocol. A majority
of real-time operating systems encourage the use of message queuing as the primary inter-process
communication mechanism for real-time applications. On Linux, message queues are first in first
out. They are implemented through the virtual file system and are supported by the real-time
library. Also, there are no proxy processes for network communication. Each process can directly
open a network socket.
7.2 Security Evaluation
7.2.1 Threat Model and Security Analysis
To fully examine the viability of the proposed application communication framework, we sim-
ulated possible attack vectors and compared the outcomes with a traditional-style implementation.
Based on existing real-world attacks, the threat model assumes adversaries can have access to the
BAN network, and some of the processes may contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Accord-
ing to the threat model, I simulated three categories of attacks from least to most starting attacker
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privilege: 1) network attacks, 2) compromised network interface attacks, 3) and compromised con-
trol process attacks. In each of these scenarios, I illustrate what possible privileges attackers can
gain to test the safety/security properties of the communication framework design.
The analysis presumes the alarm actuator process, the temperature control process, are critical
applications for the system to defend. Also, I presume proxies are trusted components that are func-
tionally correct. In practice, I believe this is a safe assumption due to proxies’ simple functionality
and potential to be automatically generated according to a high-level specification.
7.2.1.1 Attacks from Network
Network-based attacks pose great challenges for distributed BASs. Many attacks specifically
target weaknesses in industrial control and communication protocols. This analysis executed three
kinds of attacks: identity spoofing attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and DoS attacks. To the
best of my knowledge these attacks represent the majority of threats to BANs. Given the two device
scenario, I installed a third device on the network with Kali Linux to perform the network attacks.
Many industrial communication protocols can support routing traffic over TCP/IP and Eth-
ernet (e.g., BACnet/IP, Modbus TCP/IP). In the traditional implementation, an attacker on the
same network can arbitrarily send spoofing packets to control devices. Without the deployment
of proxy, false pressure differential data sent to the airflow control process will interfere with the
control logic.
However, this attack was prevented using the framework prototype. This is because the proxy
handles inter-device authentication and encryption. Those spoofing packets that weren’t encrypted
with the correct session key used between temperature control proxy and temperature sensor proxy,
hence the spoofing message cannot be authenticated and was simply be dropped or reported by
the proxy. Similarly, with the correct implementation of the secure network tunnel, assuming the
cryptographic infrastructure is implemented correctly, there is no way attackers can conduct man-in-
the-middle attacks without obtaining a certified asymmetric key pair. At most the attacker can do
is simply forward the messages. For those broadcast proxy that handles legacy processes, depends
on the specific implementation, the message might not be encrypted. Furthermore, the proxy
can incorporate with a white-list approach to prevent from receiving spoofing broadcast message.
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If the controller supports Trusted Platform Module (TPM), the proxy can take advantage of the
unforgeable device identity and use it to verify the legibility of the senders. The key point is that with
the proxy design provide a layer of abstract for authentication and system level policy enforcement
and can be tailored as needed with emerging technologies. Therefore, the integrity of control logic
and confidentiality of device data/command are preserved with the proposed framework.
On the other hand, one of the most influential attacks on a BAN is DoS attacks. DoS attack
seeks to exhaust computing and network resources in a system. With the access of the network,
attackers can flood the network and temporarily disrupt the connection between Laboratory Con-
troller and Chamber Controller. Although the attackers might not be able to infiltrate into the
control system, through DoS they might prevent or delay the sensor data to be delivered by the
temperature control process across the network. Without a proxy, the airflow control process would
be busy handling all those false requests from the network. However, using the proposed commu-
nication framework, only proxies will be directly impacted, the control loop in the airflow control
process would be still intact. Although it cannot receive the current real-time laboratory tempera-
ture, it still maintains control and can turn on the alarm or adjust the fan. Of course, if the alarm
actuator process is also a remote process, it might be impacted as well, this guarantee depends on
how the system is integrated and deployed. But in general, the proxies work like application-specific
firewalls and filter out invalid requests with high accuracy. Furthermore, although to completely
rule out the impacts of DoS attack, additional network level protection are needed, the proxy can
help detect unauthorized network traffic against the system policy and report spurious behaviors
from the BAN.
7.2.1.2 Compromised Interface Process
As most of the network-facing applications, cyber attack is a constant threat. If an attacker
can find misconfiguration or vulnerabilities in the web interface process, the attacker can arbitrarily
control the process. With this assumption, we simulated the behavior of the compromised web
interface process. First, the attacker might attempt to send spoofing message to peer processes e.g.,
the alarm actuator process and fan actuator process. With the proposed communication framework
and the underlying mandatory access control, the spoofing attempt that targets any processes
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other than the explicitly authorized process with explicitly authorized communication type would
simply fail. Hence, the integrity of high critical applications is preserved even in the presence of
compromised processes.
Furthermore, assuming the temperature control process is a high assurance application, there-
fore, the disturbance can cause by the compromised web interface is very limited. However, in the
traditional system, the attacker might be able to invoke system calls, such as kill, fork, etc., but
due to the isolation provided by the ACM policy, restriction on system calls would be imposed
even the web interface with root privilege (which, is only a concept in file system for microkernel
architecture). Although in order to fully minimize the impact of this level of compromise, a legacy
application should be running in a resource-restricted partition with a real-time scheduler. Further-
more, the proxy can be developed with monitoring mechanism, in that case even if the user interface
keeps spoofing the proxy with redundant messages in a fast speed, the invalid communication can
be simply dropped and the violation can be logged and reported. At most the proxy would be
bogged down with false messages but the main control logic would remain intact.
7.2.1.3 Compromised Field Level Control Process
Finally the field level processes, such as the temperature sensor process and alarm actuator
process in this case, also have chances to be compromised. Such breaches would be destructive
in any situation. It is the same with the proposed prototype. This problem requires additional
solutions (e.g., through the deployment of redundant sensors and actuators). However, in practice,
the negative laboratory pressure control logic is likely co-hosted with other control logic on the same
device, such as fire alarm. Even in the situation where the alarm actuator process is compromised,
the prototype application communication framework does prevent the attacker further escalating
his/her privileges on the device and network.
In general, the experimentation shows how potential risks of common network-based attacks
can be prevented or minimized without replacing existing industrial control protocols and legacy
applications immediately. Even if attackers are able to compromise some of the processes, they
won’t have total authority. Hence, no single device is solely in charge of the security of the whole
system.
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7.3 Performance Evaluation
In BAS, the response time and latency are of great importance in real-world usage. Thus, any
new features or designs much be weighed in terms of performance with the comparison of existing
systems. Security does not come without cost. The design adds a number of proxy processes and
cryptographic tunneling, and multiple context switches during operations. Hence, it is reasonable
to see a modestly increased overhead comparing to a system without using encryption as long as
the performance is acceptable in the BAS control environment.
Historically, one of the main concerns for adopting a microkernel architecture was its lower
performance when compared to monolithic architectures. However, this concern has been negated
by modern hardware and advancement of OS design. Modern microkernels, such as seL4 and
L4/Fiasco, achieve high performance through myriad code optimization techniques. Hence, these
specific disadvantages may not apply in the same way to microkernel systems in BAS domain. In
particular, the hallmark benchmark of microkernel systems, IPC latency, has been demonstrated
to be less than 100 nanoseconds for some implementations. Overall, IPC performance is the most
critical metric for microkernel performance, since all component interactions occur through IPC.
Because microkernels are highly tuned for IPC performance, this analysis hypothesized that the
additional overhead of proxy processes would be within tolerance for building automation controllers.
Based on the observations of BAN traffic from local university BAS networks, devices exchange
data on the network using BACnet protocols over UDP/IP. In the application layer, BACnet Appli-
cation Protocol Data Unit (APDU) is encapsulated in the UDP data portion. The maximum APDU
length can be as high a 1476 bytes; however, for backward compatibility, the size of BACnet packet
is usually limited to 480 bytes, which is specified in each APDU’s “MAX APDU Length Accepted”
field. Therefore, this evaluation only evaluates the performance of network latency up to 1024 bytes
in each situation. Furthermore, we see that the BAS traffic is relatively sparse (around 35 packet-
s/second for a trunk of BAN involves around 40 devices), although more data is needed to confirm
this. Because of these low-bandwidth observations, the evaluation didn’t measure bandwidth sys-
tematically (although we were able to exceed the 35 packets/second without any difficulty). Using
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Table 7.1: IPC RTT for Linux and MINIX 3 on a BeagleBone Black Board
Size (bytes) Local IPC RTT (microseconds)Linux Message Queue Linux Unix Socket MINIX 3 IPC MINIX 3 shmem
1 30.5 79.6 18 -
64 33.4 79.3 18 -
128 35.2 80.4 - 93
256 37.3 80.7 - 93
512 36.1 83.2 - 95
1024 36.6 82.5 - 95
these observations, this evaluation models the workload of the building automation system. For
comparison, the Linux network performance is measured as the baseline.
On the BeagleBone Black board, this evaluation compared two Linux IPC mechanism, the
POSIX message queue and UNIX local domain Socket, against MINIX 3 message passing (see
Tables 7.1 and 7.2). MINIX 3 clock_gettime() on BeagleBone Black is only accurate to 100 mi-
crosecond; the results shown here are the average of scaled-up tests. I observed that MINIX IPC
is faster than Linux IPC when transferring small chunks of data. MINX 3 IPC is limited to 64
bytes maximum; however, larger transfers are most optimal through shared memory. For network
communication using UDP, MINIX 3 is generally slower. We believe this is due to the lack of
overall performance optimization in MINIX 3 and an inefficient network driver for the BeagleBone.
However, this performance is still acceptable in the BAS domain. For network latency, the proxy
design only adds about 4% overhead without tunneling, and roughly 10% to 30% overhead with
tunneling (similar to Linux).
This evaluation is not a rigorous benchmark for systematically comparing different OSs’ kernel
performance. However, the result provides a preliminary evaluation of the approach for the BAS do-
main. The proposed communication framework shows promising results with tangible performance
overhead cost for the overall communication security benefits. Based on these measurements and
collected real-world BAN dataset, the solution is sufficient for BANs’ performance requirements.
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Table 7.2: Network RTT for Linux and MINIX 3 on a BeagleBone Black Board
Size
(bytes)
Network RTT
(microseconds)
Network RTT with
Encryption (microseconds)
Linux MINIX MINIX(Proxies) Linux
MINIX 3
(Proxies)
64 459.0 958.0 1000 771.6 1100
128 513.3 984.0 1100 (shmem) 685.1 1000 (shmem)
256 534.6 1040.0 1100 (shmem) 802.4 1200 (shmem)
512 638.7 1156.0 1100 (shmem) 1031.0 1600 (shmem)
1024 840.6 1386.0 1100 (shmem) 1459.6 1800 (shmem)
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CHAPTER 8: BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY AND VIRTUALIZATION
The trend towards more intelligent controls in BASs necessitates data integration and new
capabilities in the control devices. In order to satisfy the requirement, modern BAS demands more
computing power. With the advancement of hardware, many vendors of automation controllers are
gradually switching to ARM architecture as their primary computing platform of current and future
building controllers. Responding to and driving these developments, hardware technology for BAS
changed dramatically from 8-bit to 64-bit processors, from single core to multi-core [66]. Along with
software control logic, cloud clients, web server, analytics are often deployed on the same embedded
controllers, which increases the system complexity and makes it prone to potential vulnerabilities
and exploits [11].
Although there are many promising proposals in the research of CPS security, it is very rare to
see those solutions get adopted in actual products [12,13]. The challenge of upgrading the existing
BAS to satisfy the requirement of the mixed-criticality system is two-fold. First, directly applying
security in the legacy system is infeasible due to hardware limitation and the lack of security
consideration in the initial design. Many existing building controllers (e.g., Programmable Logic
Controllers) have been deployed over the last 10 years. Those controllers often do not distinguish
between user mode and privilege mode. Also, within these older models various control tasks
are built into the same memory space without an operating system to help isolate each other.
Considering their age, it is essentially impossible to patch or upgrade such devices. Exposing those
devices on the Internet will post great risks.
Secondly, completely replacing the legacy system is cost-prohibitive. Porting existing software
is a costly and time-consuming process. A study shows in businesses, porting an existing software to
other platforms generally costs 30% of the total development cost of the product [67]. Many vendors
have their own hardware platforms with customized operating systems to support their software
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stacks. For example, for the well-known Tridium automation solution they use the Honeywell JACE
embedded IoT controller, which built its software on a relatively new ARM Cortex-A8 processor,
and the QNX real-time operating system which has been in use over the last decade. This solution
is probably one of the most similar commercial uses compared to our proposed security-enhanced
OS prototype in terms of the hardware platform and OS architecture [68]. Despite the similarities,
it is non-trivial to port the existing codebase to the proposed security enhanced OS, let alone port
many of that old software on other solutions. On the other hand, new OSs often lack device driver
support from third-party vendors which further complicate the adoption process.
Those challenges are confirmed by Honeywell Sentience production team. Honeywell Sen-
tience supports the consumer and industrial IoT building automation solutions. In an effort to
integrate Honeywell control products with cloud platforms for enabling “smart” connected assets,
and advanced analytics, the core of this solution is the sentience IoT gateway. The gateway is re-
sponsible for collecting device data and communicating with cloud platforms. Hence, the security of
the gateway is crucial since compromising the gateway will allow attacks to access cloud assets and
control actuators. It is therefore preferable to construct such a gateway with the aforementioned
security microkernel platform. The Sentience team has been developing the IoT gateway target a
customized Linux over the years, although they are interested in our previous work. However, it
is unrealistic to abandon existing work in favor of better security in a foreseeable future. Hence,
any practical solution must be non-intrusive and facilitate this transition in a gradual incremental
process.
The lessons we learned from this experience:
• It is cost-prohibitive to abandon legacy software stacks for businesses.
• It is infeasible to expect businesses to build applications from scratch in favor of security.
8.1 Virtualization
One of the solutions for converging legacy software and the new platform is through virtualiza-
tion [69]. Virtualization refers to the technologies designed to provide a virtual runtime environment
for hosting software that traditionally runs on physical computers. Virtualization has been the key
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technology to cloud computing [70]. It allows different operating systems to share the same hard-
ware resources efficiently and maintain independence. This method divides physical resources into
multiple shares which makes applications more accessible, reduces the number of resources required,
provides better management, and thereby cut costs. Most importantly, programs do not need to
depend on specific OS.
Driven by cost and security concerns, virtualization on embedded system-on-a-chip (SoC) is
prevailing [71]. Especially, with advanced hardware assists, the impact on performance degradation
is minimal [72]. The fundamental idea behind virtualization is to abstract the hardware, e.g., CPU,
memory, network etc. into isolated execution environments to allow each separate environment to
run as if on a private computer. Virtualization brings desirable benefits to embedded devices. Em-
bedded virtualization allows consolidation of multiple heterogeneous hosts with rich functionalities
on a single piece of silicon. Using embedded virtualization not only reduces costs but also provides
a mean to host legacy applications. The strongest motivation for embedded Virtualization is that
it increases the BAS security by isolating software in provisioned environments. This idea is specif-
ically fitting for mixed-criticality systems in BAS. If the isolation between virtual environments can
be guaranteed, and the communication policy can be strongly enforced according to specification,
then critical processes in BAS would have their own dedicated (virtual) processor, and their own
dedicated (virtual) memory space, even they are co-hosted in the same physical controllers. The
impact of potential breaches can be minimized by running those control tasks in a virtual machine.
Even better is that legacy software can expect to require very minimal modifications.
In general, embedded virtualization on ARM architecture can be provided in two ways, para-
virtualization, and hardware assisted virtualization [73]. Para-virtualization is a virtualization tech-
nique that uses a modified guest operating system in cooperation with the hypervisor to simulate
runtime environment. In para-virtualization, the guest OS runs in user-land as a normal process.
The hypervisor runs in kernel space [74]. The guest OS communicates with the hypervisor through
an abstract layer called virtual machine monitor (VMM). The VMM provides the guest OS with
extra APIs, called hypercalls for accessing hardware related services, such as virtual memory man-
agement, interrupts, and networks. Because conventional OSs are expected to run in kernel space,
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that directly manages hardware and those OSs have to be explicitly ported to use the VMM API.
The benefit of this technique is that no special hardware is required, and it is relatively easier and
more efficient compared to completely simulated lower level hardware since the OS and hypervi-
sor that work together to save the work to emulate the system’s resources. Projects such as Xen,
L4Re and, VMware support this approach [75, 76]. However, the modification of conventional OSs
are not trivial. Additionally, because the guest OS cannot directly access hardware devices, the
drivers in the guest OS have to be modified accordingly. Last but not least, the VMM and memory
management in the hypervisor add additional overhead which increases the performance impact, in
comparison with running native system directly on the hardware. As Varanasi et al. pointed out,
para-virtualization has the drawback of high engineering costs for having to modify guest OSs [72].
The other approach is using hardware assisted virtualization [72]. Hardware assisted virtual-
ization relies on additional hardware support to provide virtual environments. The benefit of this
approach is that it allows unmodified conventional OSs in virtual machines with minimal overhead.
In demand of virtualization requirement, both ARM and X86 architecture have provided a plat-
form that support hardware assisted virtualization. With the release of ARM Cortex-A15, ARM
now supports virtualization extensions in their architecture [77]. These extensions provide three
major parts: 1) CPU virtualization extension, 2) memory virtualization, and 3) I/O virtualization
extension. CPU virtualization adds a new privileged CPU mode, HYP mode (privilege level PL2).
This HYP mode has a higher privilege than regular kernel mode (privilege level PL1) which allows
the hypervisor to execute sensitive instructions. Additionally, this CPU extension adds an extra
set of vector tables and registers for simulating dedicated virtual CPUs on which guest OSs can
possess without releasing during context mode switch. With the support of memory virtualization,
ARM provides multiple layers of memory address translation directly implemented in hardware.
This implementation simplifies the hypervisor’s work of virtual memory management and improves
the performance. Using software to emulate I/O devices is expensive, the I/O extension provides
virtual interrupt handlings to facilitate this process. Using the virtual interrupt distributor, the
hypervisor can pass-through specific interrupt handlings directly to virtual machines without incur-
ring overhead for routing and tracking each I/O operations. For some latest ARM models, it even
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added system MMU that allows the hypervisor to set up direct memory access (DMA) with guest
OSs securely, which reduces the risk of malicious DMA drivers to temper physical memory. This
approach is preferable for embedded virtualization not only because it reduces the complexity of
implementing hypervisor and provides virtual machines with near minimal performance overhead.
Most important, this approach improves system reliability and security.
8.2 Architecture
The hypervisor solution shows a promising direction for supporting the requirement of a
secure BAS controller in practice. However, security of BAS controllers does not come naturally
with virtualization. With this approach, the functional correctness and reliability of the hypervisor
are crucial. Since the system depends on the hypervisor to guarantee the isolation, any malfunctions
in the hypervisor will threaten the functionality of critical control tasks. Since the hypervisor is
running in HYP mode, if there are vulnerabilities in the hypervisor, they can be exploited, which
will give attackers higher privilege than the kernel itself.
One of the popular hypervisors is KVM [78]. KVM is a virtualization framework that turns
the Linux kernel into a hypervisor. Maintained by Linux community, KVM has the advantage
of rich services and drivers support. But due to the monolithic kernel design, KVM suffers the
same threats as Linux. Recently researches have shown that many vulnerabilities such as the guest
execution escape, the guest reads of other guest data, the ring 3 to ring 0 privilege escalation can
be exploited [79].
8.2.1 seL4 as Microvisor
Given that monolithic kernels are inherently impossible to secure without compromising the
usability and compatibility, the microkernel approach presents an alternative solution [80]. In order
to make the security assumption sound, the underlying hypervisor must be robust, functionally
correct without undefined behaviors, and preferably have a TCB as small as possible. For these
reasons, the formally-verified seL4 microkernel presents an excellent solution for implementing a
microkernel-based hypervisor, so-called microvisor [69].
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A Microkernel is a minimal system base for providing hardware abstraction to build various
system services. A hypervisor is designed solely for the purpose of managing underlying hardware for
multiplexing resources among various virtual runtime environments, which includes both user-land
services and kernel code. Due to the similarity functionality and structure, a microkernel can be
used to implement a hypervisor. The L4 microkernel family has been built as a microvisor to support
both para-virtualization and hardware assisted virtualization for a long time. Both OKL4 and L4
Fiasco (L4Re) have demonstrated preeminent results as hypervisors in industry and academia [24].
However, none of any existing microkernels can provide the same level of assurance compared to the
seL4. The seL4 community has developed a proof-of-concept seL4-based microvisor for the ARM
Cortex-A15 processor. Leveraging on the hardware assisted virtualization, Data61 released a library
for constructing VMM. For those reasons, this research uses the seL4 microvisor as the fundamental
platform for implementing the BAS controller prototype.
8.2.2 Policy-enforced Mandatory Access Control
Microvisor isolates control tasks into various virtual machines, but in the BAS domain, many
control tasks also need to communicate and cooperate together to achieve the daily operations.
Therefore, a mandatory access control mechanism that enables developers to enforce fine-grained
communication policies only on those tasks that are allowed to cooperate is necessary. The seL4’s
capability-based access model provides a flexible method to transparently mediate system-wide
security policies between virtual environments. In seL4’s capability-based design, everything is an
object. Each kernel object represents a share of resources, e.g., memory pages, device mapped
regions, communication channels, etc. The capability is an unforgeable token with associated access
rights that refers to the corresponding kernel object. Each capability can be assigned to a specific
process. The kernel manages the capability token on behalf of processes. When an object is created
the kernel returns an index in the owner process capability table, which can be used by the process
to refer the actual kernel objects and invoke its functions. Kernel protects this capability table,
therefore it is unforgeable.
For two processes to communicate with each other, processes need to possess the capability
of the communication channel, an IPC endpoint. Hence, if processes do not own such a capability,
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they cannot communicate. Essentially, the system-widely security policies are enforced in form of
capability distribution that can be pre-configured statically. To ease the development, the seL4 com-
munity provided a domain specific language, called capDL for describing the capability distribution
of seL4 systems. The capDL reads the specification and translates it to low-level C code. This work
relies on the capDL to create and distribute both capabilities of IPC endpoints, and shared memory
pages between processes and virtual machines. The generated capability distribution is built in to
the first user-land process, init, which also serves as a process loader during booting.
8.2.3 Secure Execution Environment
Using the seL4 microvisor and the policy-enforced mandatory access control, we can set up
two runtime environments, the native seL4 partition, and the Linux virtual machine. The native
partition is the runtime environment that directly runs on top of seL4 with access to kernel API. The
partition provides strong isolation and higher security due to the small TCB, and high-assurance
capability-based access model, enforced directly by the seL4 kernel. Applications in this partition
only depend on a thin layer of code in the form of a seL4 process with the support of existing system
services and device drivers. However for the same reason above, there is no POSIX-compliant
system calls that exist yet, and there are limited device drivers. Hence, the application has to be
implemented in a unique way. On the other hand, the Linux partition provides a rich runtime
for existing legacy or low criticality applications. With the hardware assistance, the unmodified
Linux kernel runs as a seL4 process. Because conventional Linux kernel does not link with seL4
libraries and executes in its own memory space, it does not aware of the underlying seL4, and
therefore impossible to communicate with applications run in the native partition. Applications in
the Linux environment is the same as if they are running in a conventional Linux system. They can
access standard APIs, system calls, libraries etc. and most of them can execute without porting.
Furthermore, some of the device drivers in the Linux kernel can also be reused to alleviate the
absence of device drivers in seL4.
The policy-enforced communication between the Linux partition and the native partition can
be achieved through a loadable kernel module. Linux kernel modules are pieces of binary code that
can be dynamically loaded and unloaded during runtime. Linux kernel modules run in Linux kernel
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space. It extends the kernel functionality. In this setup, one can build a communication kernel
module that is aware of the seL4 capability model and kernel calls. When an application in Linux
needs to communicate with native services or processes, the application can invoke the registered
system calls, and through this kernel module messages or data can be sent or received from an IPC
endpoint.
In this way, this solution balances usability and security by hosting both Linux execution
environments and the high-assurance native environment for practical purposes. Most importantly,
in the effort to ease the process of migration from the traditional general-purpose Linux to the
microkernel driven high-assurance system for controllers in the BAS domain, this solution enables
an incremental strategy to focus on specific functions first, while allowing the rest of the system to
continue to be built.
8.3 Experiment Implementation
This section documents the implementation of the proposed prototype using the seL4 micro-
visor. Using the open-source seL4 microvisor, this solution sets up the platform with two runtime
environments, one Linux partition realized by a customized Linux virtual machine, and one native
partition with seL4 native processes. Additionally, I implemented a secure boot chain system to
protect software integrity. The secure boot procedure applies the cryptographic methods in the
booting process, which verifies each component’s digital signature and guarantees only authorized
components can be loaded in the platform.
8.3.1 Prototype
For the development, the prototype uses an NVIDIA Jetson Tegra K1 System-on-Module
(TK1-SOM) from Colorado Engineering Inc. as the target platform. The TK1-SOM board carries
an NVIDIA Tegra K1 processor which features ARM Cortex-A15 Quad core. Besides the Tegra K1
CPU, it also includes 8GB memory, 32GB eMMC flash, with rich I/O (USB 3.0, Ethernet, GPIO,
etc.). There are two reasons why I chose this board. First, the ARM Cortex-A15 processor is the
first ARM processor that supports ARM Virtualization Extensions. Secondly, the board is directly
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supported by both the Linux and the seL4 community Therefore it saves the effort of porting and
accelerates the development process.
Using the Data61’s proof-of-concept seL4-based microvisor solution, the prototype is struc-
tured as shown in Figure 8.1. There are 5 major components, the capDL-loader, a virtual machine
monitor, a guest Linux OS, and a communication server. The capDL-loader is the root process and
user-land initializer for seL4 system [81]. As part of the capDL toolkit, the capDL-loader contains
functions that are translated directly from the capDL language during compiling time. It takes
the description from generated C files from system specification and calls seL4 kernel to allocate
resources, such as creating IPC endpoints, process control blocks, and distribute capability to the
right owner. Another purpose of this init process, is to load programs into the system from ELFs
in a combined CIPO archive. Finally, after all the tasks during the booting process are done, this
init starts all other process and hibernates.
Figure 8.1: Secure execution environment using seL4 microvisor
Another important component is the virtual machine monitor (VMM). The VMM is the soft-
ware that creates the virtual environment. In the prototype, the VMM is realized using CAmkES
(Component Architecture for Microkernel-based Embedded Systems) runtime framework a native
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seL4 process. CAmkES is designed with the intention to facilitate the process of building applica-
tions and servers using the seL4 microkernel. Due to the uniqueness of seL4, it is different from the
traditional Unix-like system. Specifically, applications in the seL4-based system require the use of
IPCs frequently, manually implementing all the process interactions and keeping track of capability,
which is not trivial. The CAmkES follows a component-based approach which models the system
as a set of interacting software and provides various predefined modules for developers to abstractly
specify the communication without worry about detailed implementation [82].
The VMM monitors the system events and interrupts for the guest OS, and traps privilege
instructions in order to pass it to the seL4 system. During boot time, VMM initializes the virtual
GIC, and virtual CPU, configures direct memory mapping and passes through hardware. After
the environment is setup, the VMM would load the guest OS kernel, the device tree, and the root
filesystem (a Busybox ramdisk) in the memory and pass control to the kernel. During runtime, the
VMM manages guest OS’s capabilities, virtual memory spaces, interrupts, and saves/restores CPU
states for context switches, etc.
For the Linux guest OS, the system runs a customized conventional Linux that is cross-
compiled for the target board. The Linux kernel and the Busybox ramdisk image are built through
the Buildroot embedded Linux build system, one of the popular tools that automate the process.
The Linux contains a kernel module, which when loaded in the system will register as a virtual
device that can interact with Linux applications through ioctl() system call.
The last component of the system is a communication server. The communication server is
a seL4 native process. The purpose of this process is for conducting data sharing between Linux
processes that are running in the virtual environment and native applications. The communication
server is also a CAmkES component. The system configures a shared memory page between the
virtual machine and the communication server. For each pair of communications between the
communication server and other native seL4 processes, a dedicated IPC endpoint would be used.
The communication server serves as a dispatcher. When a message is received either from the shared
memory or any endpoint, the message will be queued and forwarded to the corresponding receiver.
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8.3.2 Secure Boot
Although the virtualization solution is good for compartmentalizing legacy and potentially
vulnerable applications, it does not prevent attackers from physically tampering with the device or
modifying the boot process to load a malicious OS. The countermeasure is the secure boot [83]. The
secure boot is a critical security feature to ensure that only authorized (digitally signed) software
can be booted from the device. The secure boot ties the software to the underlying hardware,
by applying cryptographic methods such as digital signatures in each step of the system booting
process, starting from the moment the hardware is initialized. Since only properly signed binary
can be verified and loaded in the system, the secure boot makes sure only authorized software can
execute on the specific hardware. Using this solution, the software can delegate the trust through
the so-called “chain of trust”, all the way from bootloader to user-land applications. There are
various standard secure boot solutions that offer both specification and implementation, such as
Unified Extensible Interface specification, U-boot’s verified boot, etc. [84] In this experiment, the
TK1 board uses U-boot as the bootloader. I implemented a secure boot procedure that allows
each component in the system to verify the next one during the booting process and incorporate
it with U-boot’s verified boot. The seL4 on ARM booting process is similar to the Linux booting
process. For the specific development board, the booting procedure starts from TK1 Boot ROM
when powered on. The booting process is in the following order (most ARM SoMs follow the similar
steps):
1. TK1 boot ROM, a vendor owned custom boot ROM. The boot ROM initializes RAM, loads
secondary bootloader into memory, and passes control to the secondary bootloader, U-boot,
an open-source secondary bootloader for embedded devices.
2. U-boot reads its environment variables from the boot device, detects hardware resources,
configures CPU to HYP mode, and loads the ELFloader (seL4 bootloader), the seL4 kernel,
and the root task process into RAM before passes control to the ELFloader.
3. ELFloader moves the seL4 kernel, and the root task (CapDL-loader) into the right physical
memory address and configures boot variables for seL4. Then, it passes control to seL4.
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4. seL4 starts execution. It configures hardware resources and schedules the root task in user
mode before it makes the capDL-loader runnable.
5. CapDL-loader loads other user mode applications and distributes resources in the form of
capabilities. In this specific prototype, those processes are the communication server and the
virtual machine monitor.
6. VMM configures the virtual execution environment for the guest OS, loads Linux kernel binary,
ramdisk, and the device tree blob into memory and passes control to the Linux kernel.
Following the boot process, I implemented the proof-of-concept secure boot procedure starting
from the ELFloader in the seL4 system. First, I inserted a public key in the ELFloader and used the
private key signed seL4 kernel and the capDL-loader, and appended their signatures on the end of
each binary. Before loading, the ELFloader calculates the hash of each binary and checks the digital
signature against the hash value. The ELFloader will only continue if the signature matches. Then,
I included a similar procedure in the init process, capDL-loader to make sure the capDL-loader will
verify the communication server and the VMM. Finally, the verification procedure is added in the
VMM, so that only signed the Linux kernel, ramdisk, and the device tree blob would be executed
on the board.
Additionally, this work integrates this with U-boot’s verified boot. U-boot introduced their
implementation of secure boot called verified boot, which allows developers to embed cryptographic
keys in the bootloader for verification purpose. Also, U-boot’s verified boot uses a new file format,
called flattened image tree (FIT), a flexible, structured container format which supports multiple
kernel images, device trees, and ramdisks. With this format, it is easy to add signatures and other
metadata to instruct U-boot how to load the system. I compiled the seL4 and its components into
a FIT image to utilize this mechanism.
In production, many SoC vendors, such as Xilinx, NXP support secure boot specification
compatible secure boot solutions (e.g., NXP High Availability Boot v4). They often provide secure
boot enabled boot ROMs along with additional hardware storage (Xlinux uses BBRAM storage)
and eFuses for programming unpurgeable encryption key. Working with vendors, one can embed our
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proprietary cryptographic key on the board in the future. Such key can be used to sign a secondary
bootloader, such as U-boot to allow only our authorized U-boot with the desired configuration can
be executed in the board for an end to end guarantee.
8.4 Evaluation
To evaluate the security and practicality of this solution in the BAS domain, the prototype
adopted an IoT gateway scenario from Honeywell business and implemented in the aforementioned
system. This section explains the scenario I implemented and the security analysis of this approach.
8.4.1 IoT Gateway
Working with Honeywell engineers revealed that one of the security-critical components in
the next generation BAS is the IoT gateway. While many BAS devices get replaced by their latest
counterparts for providing more “intelligent” controls, devices rely more and more on cloud-based
computing services. The IoT gateway is a device that gathers and stores data from the field (office,
home, factory etc.) and provides communication between local systems and the cloud. As an
edge device which serves an entry point in bridging the Internet, the home, and industrial building
automation systems, IoT gateway plays a key role in the convergence of traditional BAS and Internet
of Services. Hence, its security is inextricably linked to the safety and security of the facility.
Among all of the functionalities in IoT gateway, I have been told that the biggest concern
for business is protecting the authentication key which is used for authentication and providing
secure communication between the gateway and the cloud. In an effort to demonstrate the security
benefits of the proposed solution in the BAS domain, this experiment uses the key management as
an example for evaluating the security benefits of the microvisor solution.
In conventional systems, the key management relies on file system and discretionary access
control to protect cryptographic keys as shown in Figure 8.2. During runtime, the key management
server would load the key in its space. The key management server is responsible for providing
cryptographic services (e.g., encryption, decryption, digital signing, signature verification, etc.) for
authorized peer process, such as the cloud client. When needed, the cloud client will communicate
with the key management server using UNIX local domain socket. To protect those cryptographic
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keys from malicious access, in this implementation I moved the key management from Linux parti-
tion to the seL4 native partition. During boot time, the keys are only available in the seL4 partition
and are loaded in the key management server. The cloud client is hosted in the Linux partition.
When the cloud client requires cryptographic services, the cloud client would issue a system call,
like asking for the kernel’s or drivers’ service. The kernel module would check the privilege of the
process. If the request is granted the kernel module would forward the request to the communica-
tion server in the seL4 partition by invoking the corresponding capability using seL4 IPC primitive.
Eventually, the communication would be passed to the key management server and the result would
be returned to the cloud client on a similar path. From the Linux application’s point of view, the
actual implementation is transparent, hence very little modification in the source code is needed.
Figure ?? shows the logic of architecture and communication path.
Figure 8.2: Cloud connector in conventional systems
8.4.2 Security Evaluation
To assess this approach, I analyzed possible attack vectors in comparison with conventional
implementation. Based on existing real-world attacks, our threat model assumes 2 level attacks.
First, attacks remotely with possible compromised processes, secondly, attack with physical access
of the device. Due to the functional correctness guarantee provided by seL4’s formal verification,
this work assumes the microvisor is high-assurance and does not contain software vulnerabilities.
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Figure 8.3: Cloud connector in secure execution environment
Considering the IoT gateway is an edge device in the conventional system, if there are vul-
nerabilities in one of the applications running in Linux partition, attackers might be able to gain
remote access by exploiting such weaknesses. Once the attackers gain access to the device, it is
possible for attackers to access cryptographic keys directly from file system if the file permission is
not configured correctly or through further privilege escalation. However, this threat is mitigated
by the microvisor solution. Because cryptographic keys and the key management server are hosted
in the seL4 native partition, as long as the fundamental IPC and memory management in seL4 is
not breached, even attackers with Linux root privilege cannot obtain the keys.
In conventional systems, if not configured properly, a malicious process might be able to spoof
local IPC and abuse the key management server without obtaining the keys. This kind of attack,
although is possible, is easier to mitigate in the microvisor solution. In the microvisor solution, if
a malicious application wants to request services from the key management server, it would need
to invoke the customized system call. The kernel module which processes the system call acts as
a proxy and would be able to scrutinize the request. Because the module is running in kernel
space with high privilege, developers can implement the module to check the identity of the caller
process. As long as the kernel is not compromised, and the kernel module inserts a proper security
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check before authorizing any request, the attackers cannot abuse the services. If the attackers can
compromise the Linux kernel, then it is possible for them to spoof request and abuse the services
as if they own the key. However, if we assume the attackers can compromise the Linux kernel, they
basically own the system and can do far more worst things. Hence, in comparison, the microvisor
solution is still superior from the system security perspective.
On the other hand, if the attackers have physical access to the device, more attack vectors
have to be considered. In the conventional system, attackers might be able to replace the booting
image and launch a malicious version by which they have full control to access the storage and
obtain the keys. With the support of the secure boot, such attackers can be eliminated, because
unsigned kernel images and applications cannot be loaded. In order to fully protect the system from
physical tampering, in both of those solutions, additional security mechanisms, such as whole disk
encryption, hardware cryptographic chips, e.g., a Trusted Platform Module, have to be applied.
However, such mechanisms are easier to adopt in the seL4 native partition due to the modular
design in seL4, and because there is no legacy dependency in such a system.
8.4.3 Performance
In addition to the security analysis, I also conducted a performance evaluation. The seL4
microkernel has been proven to be the world’s fastest microkernel [85]. As [61] shows the IPC in seL4
on ARM architecture is within a couple hundred nanoseconds (ARMv7 Cortex-A9 353 nanoseconds
for sending a single, minimal-length message between two threads). Our early implementation is on
an i.MX6 board which uses the same processor. The benchmark result shows transfer of data up
to 512 bytes between two threads, in round trips, takes about 3 microseconds, which is faster than
conventional Linux on the same setup (around 50 microseconds for Linux). Although it is debatable
whether such comparison is fair due to the architectural differences, this benchmark shows seL4 is
the fastest among microkernels and microkernel architecture does not imply inferior performance.
To evaluate the virtualization performance, I compared the native Linux system performance
and the virtualized Linux using a widely used system performance benchmark tool, called lmbench.
The lmbench is a micro-benchmark suite that is designed to measure commonly found performance
bottlenecks [86]. Table 8.1 shows the comparison on the NVIDIA Tegra K1 board. The TK1 consists
75
of 4 ARM Cortex-A15 cores, clocked up to 2 GHz. Because the current seL4 microvisor does not
support multicore yet, the native Linux measurement is adjusted to run on one core as well. To
show a fair comparison, both of those setups are clocked at 696MHz.
With the ARM virtualization extensions, the only interactions between VM and the microvisor
are context switches between two partitions, VM entries, exits, and interrupts. Hence the overhead is
minimal. This estimation matches our benchmark results, the VM shows nearly native performance.
Many micro-benchmarks even shows negative overhead, such as write, pipe latency, and UNIX
socket. Those results likely happens because the VM was using memory mapped storage, rather
than MMC storage or cache related conflicts. Our result matches the result shown in [87], in which
Gernot et al. used the RapiLog database system and demonstrated that on average the degradation
of a virtual machine can be as low as 9%. Virtualization overheads highly depend on workload
and hardware platform. This benchmark is not a rigorous performance comparison between native
Linux and seL4 microvisor. This is merely to show that the performance of seL4 microvisor with
ARM virtualization extensions is not going to be a bottleneck in practical adoption.
Table 8.1: Lmbench results for seL4 microvisor on TK1 clocked at 696 MHz
Benchmark Native VM Overhead
null syscall
read
write
stat
fstat
open/close
select(10)
select(100)
signal install
signal overhead
protection fault
pipe latency
UNIX socket
fork+exit
fork+execve
0.6043 µs
0.7984 µs
1.1256 µs
4.8211 µs
1.1115 µs
12.4576 µs
1.4831 µs
7.0216 µs
1.3617 µs
6.0025 µs
1.7337 µs
38.4235 µs
44.0403 µs
847.6667 µs
4088.0 µs
0.6993 µs
1.2275 µs
0.8180 µs
5.5214 µs
1.2505 µs
20.0 µs
2.3302 µs
7.8527 µs
1.6809 µs
7.0985 µs
1.0073 µs
20.6930 µs
30.4076 µs
939.0 µs
3623.0 µs
0.0950 µs
0.4391 µs
-0.3076 µs
0.7003 µs
0.1290 µs
7.7424 µs
0.8471 µs
0.8311 µs
0.3202 µs
1.0960 µs
-0.7264 µs
-17.7305 µs
-13.6327 µs
91.3333 µs
-785.0 µs
15 %
55 %
-27 %
15 %
12 %
62 %
57 %
12 %
24 %
18 %
-41 %
-46 %
-30 %
11 %
-19 %
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation describes a secure computing platform for the next generation building au-
tomation system. In the process of study the problem domain, I conducted an empirical study of two
real-life building automation systems; analyzed the various potential security and safety risks; and
proposed a microkernel-based secure computing platforms in an attempt to address those security
issues for the next-generation BAS. With the consideration of compatibility with existing systems,
this solution leverages the microkernel operating system architecture and applies mandatory access
control and proxy-based network communication for enforcing the global policies in the automation
controllers in a simple and clear way. Compared to other approaches, this solution has a sound
and robust foundation, and most importantly, it provides a backward compatible method for incre-
mental development. It is robust because of the microkernel’s minimal functionality in the kernel
space, and modular architecture that can be mathematically proven to be functionally correct. It is
backward compatible since legacy applications can be hosted in a virtual environment and the proxy
design secures BAS network communication protocol through network tunneling. For evaluating the
proposed solution, various building automation scenarios have been implemented, such as the lab-
oratory temperature control scenario, key management scenario, and their corresponding attacks.
These experiments show the security benefits of the proposed solution and tangible performance.
Additionally, in order to help businesses in the building automation domain to adopt this
approach, and migrate their legacy system to the secure platform without completely changing
their existing software, this dissertation presents a virtualization approach that uses the formally
verified seL4 as a microvisor for hosting legacy BAS systems. This approach is rooted in facilitating
business adaption while balancing the cost-security tradeoffs. Furthermore, it leverages the formally
verified microkernel seL4 for its unique advantages of mathematically proven security guarantee, and
recent progress in ARM virtualization technology. Using seL4 microvisor with a virtualized Linux,
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this method provides two partitions: one for hosting legacy software with rich functionality, the
other directly running on top of the high assurance seL4 environment for hosting safety/security-
critical applications. Hosting a Linux virtual machine on top of seL4, allows developers to secure
critical elements first and leave the rest of the system mostly unchanged. Most importantly, the
system can evolve with time, as the products change.
There are several limitations of this approach in practice. First, the mandatory access control
through an access control matrix requires kernel modification, every time new policies are intro-
duced. This is partially due to the design of MINIX 3 kernel IPC primitives, and the microkernel
structure. However, there are multiple efforts to make the process more transparent, and automatic.
For example, one promising solution is to automatically generate the access control matrix, proxy
process, and application code skeleton from the system model. Collaborating with researchers from
Kansas State University, we used AADL to model the control tasks, policies in BAS, and applied
Dr. Robby’s Slang/Logika program verifier to automatically generate the ACM, and proxy process
in C. The approach is still in its preliminary stage but it has shown promising results. On the
other hand, seL4’s capability-based model shows another promising approach. By applying for the
capability-based access in the kernel, the policy can be implemented in user-land, which is more
flexible. The proposed platform is still in the early stage, which lacks robust device drivers, and
libraries. More work is needed in porting existing drivers and implementing wrapper libraries to
make the system easier to use, as well as optimizing performance, and efficiency.
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